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The International Intellectual Property (IIP) system has become increasingly 
complex. Once a patchwork of bilateral treaties relating solely to intellectual 
property, it has transformed into an intricate system comprising bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, international institutions, multinational enterprises, 
nongovernmental organizations, and other nonstate actors, affecting areas as 
diverse as public health, the environment, human rights, and biodiversity, among 
others.1 Navigating this complex system is difficult. Making changes within this 
system is even more so. 
Chief among the various components that comprise the IIP system is the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 1994 Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the most significant development in 
modern intellectual property law. In 2014, in the context of the twentieth 
anniversary of TRIPS, the Max Planck Institute of Innovation and Competition 
drafted the Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS 
(Declaration). The Declaration purports to merely clarify the regulatory options that 
states retain under TRIPS.2 It does not. Rather, the Declaration goes beyond merely 
clarifying policy space and appears intended to modify existing legal rules under 
TRIPS and/or to limit the adverse effects of WTO decisions interpreting various 
TRIPS provisions. Paradoxically, the Declaration simultaneously undermines 
TRIPS and extends TRIPS’s influence. 
To be clear, this is not a criticism of the Declaration’s substantive objectives. 
The majority of the Declaration indeed identifies legitimate policy space, and this 
Article agrees with the Declaration’s ultimate goal of providing states with greater 
discretion to implement domestic intellectual property laws consistently with states’ 
technological and economic development.3 Moreover, changed circumstances since 
 
1. As recently as the early 1990s, the treaties and international organizations concerned with 
intellectual property occupied a highly specialized and technocratic corner of international law, with 
few connections to other issue areas. That relative isolation ended in 1994, when the United States and 
the European Communities, pressured by their respective intellectual property industries, shifted 
negotiations over intellectual property from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and linked the result of those negotiations (the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement) to the new WTO dispute settlement 
system. See Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 20–22 (2004). 
2. Matthias Lamping et al., Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 
45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 679, 680 ¶ 2 (2014). 
3. Elsewhere I have argued that we should seek ways in which TRIPS can “provide more 
freedom to developing countries to explicitly consider public welfare and other national and 
Harris_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:36 AM 
2016] THE POWER OF IDEAS 345 
the adoption of TRIPS may justify changes to existing law. But, in notable areas, 
the Declaration pronounces as law interpretations that are difficult to reconcile with 
current law. This Article highlights those areas. 
The Declaration is a significant pronouncement of the state of contemporary 
IIP law, but it is just as significant for what it teaches us about contemporary IIP 
lawmaking. Hence, in addition to evaluating some of the Declaration’s specific 
provisions, this Article focuses on the process of IIP lawmaking by which relevant 
actors might pursue desired outcomes. Traditional modes of lawmaking involve 
strategies and changes within a particular structure or organization (i.e., horizontal 
lawmaking). Over time, however, shifts in governance have also occurred through 
different modes of lawmaking, such as “regime shifting,” whereby states and 
nonstate actors attempt to change law by relocating rulemaking processes to other 
venues to effect more favorable outcomes, and “competitive regime creation,” 
where actors create new regimes that compete with existing ones.4 The drafters of 
the Declaration might, too, change existing law, but from outside the state-centric 
world of international organizations. That alternative approach might be 
characterized as a “bottom-up” approach (i.e., vertical lawmaking). 
Looking to these various alternative modes of IIP lawmaking (including 
regime shifting and competitive regime creation) and also to grassroots movements, 
this Article identifies key criteria that should exist for an effective bottom-up 
process. These criteria include, at a minimum, (1) strategic planning by a group of 
experts with the legitimacy to create alternative policies, (2) building transnational 
solidarity around the alternative policies, (3) establishing both formal and informal 
channels of communication with states’ policymakers, and (4) using the influence 
of the transnational network to foster an international dialogue that urges states’ 
policymakers to consider the consequences and benefits of alternative policies. 
Applying these criteria, the Article evaluates the Declaration’s effectiveness in using 
the power of ideas to agitate and exert pressure on existing doctrine, for example, 
the arguably restrictive nondiscrimination provision in TRIPS. As stated at the 
outset, effecting change is difficult. But it begins somewhere, and the Declaration 
may just be that beginning. 
Seen from this perspective, the Declaration and alternative modes of 
international lawmaking invite us to rethink the various dimensions of power. 
Rather than the market power of the IP world, or the material power of well-organized 
and well-financed trade associations that can lobby to secure their interests in 
 
international policy interests, such as public health, human rights, environmental rights, and 
biodiversity.” Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past or a Small 
Step Forward?, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 189 (2007); see also Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke 
Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 681, 743 (2006) (“[T]he 
objectives and principles of the treaty assist in balancing the private rights of inventors with the rights 
of an invention’s users. In any debate over TRIPS, therefore, WTO Panels and the AB must recognize 
and preserve these objectives and principles.”). 
4. Julia C. Morse & Robert E. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9 REV. OF INT’L ORG. 385, 
392 (2014) [hereinafter Contested Multilateralism]. 
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legislation, or the political power of the United States in international negotiations, or 
even the institutional power of the WTO vis-à-vis other international organizations, 
the Declaration reminds us of another, sometimes hidden, dimension of power: the 
power of ideas. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly describes the international 
intellectual property system and how it has been transformed. Part III introduces 
the Declaration, examines the stated goal of the Declaration, and evaluates a number 
of key provisions. This Part also questions the underlying basis of the Declaration 
that WTO Member states are free to deny protection to inventions by 
differentiating among inventions, despite both the specific language of TRIPS and 
WTO decisions interpreting relevant TRIPS provisions. Part IV then challenges the 
Declaration by reviewing these key WTO decisions, and by also recounting the 
TRIPS negotiation history. While there are strong arguments on both sides of the 
interpretation issue, the WTO decisions and the negotiation history present a 
compelling case against the interpretation advanced in the Declaration. 
Part V explores the changing dynamics of international lawmaking. In 
particular, this Part demonstrates that lawmaking is no longer dominated by one 
mode. Rather, as the international intellectual property system has changed, the 
dynamics of lawmaking have changed. This Part suggests that even if the 
Declaration’s interpretation of existing law is flawed, it can nevertheless serve as a 
springboard for change through one or any number of the new modes of 
lawmaking. Finally, Part VI advocates for the drafters of the Declaration to consider 
these alternative modes, and attempts to identify ways to ultimately strengthen the 
goals of the Declaration. In other words, recent developments make clear that there 
are numerous ways to effectuate change in the international intellectual property 
system. While much of the Article is somewhat pessimistic about the method 
advanced in the Declaration, the Article is optimistic that other methods might 
prove more fruitful and that the Declaration can be instrumental in accomplishing 
its ultimate goal. This Part, while not advocating for any particular mode, does, 
however, offer a few suggestions on how these goals might be achieved. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 
Developed in 1994 under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Uruguay Round trade negotiations, TRIPS “is unquestionably the most 
important development in international intellectual property law” since the 
international intellectual property treaties of the 1880s (i.e., the 1883 Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the 1886 Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works).5 TRIPS significantly 
strengthens intellectual property rights worldwide. 
 
5. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 (1998). 
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TRIPS was an attempt to reconcile varying levels of intellectual property 
protection and enforcement in different states. The varying levels are due to each 
country’s widely different goals, values, histories, cultures, political climates, and 
economic and technological stages of development. To reconcile these varying 
interests, TRIPS mandates that all countries provide intellectual property protection 
at specified levels significantly beyond those previously established in any 
international intellectual property treaty.6 For some countries, this required very 
little change in their laws. For others, however, TRIPS required significant changes. 
Prior to 1994, intellectual property matters fell under the purview of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Because the United States and the 
European Union (EU) considered the United Nations (UN) and its organizations 
hostile—or, at the very least, indifferent—to developed countries and overly 
sympathetic to developing countries, the United States began efforts to move 
intellectual property from WIPO to the WTO. The WTO’s trade regime 
traditionally favored developed countries with large, attractive export markets. In 
addition to being a more favorable forum, the WTO included the relatively strong 
and effective enforcement mechanism, which was lacking in WIPO. That 
mechanism was among the prizes sought by the developed countries in TRIPS. The 
move from WIPO to the WTO was monumental, allowing developed countries to 
flaunt their trade advantage and superior bargaining position within the context of 
intellectual property rights, inevitably producing an intellectual property treaty 
slanted in their favor. 
Although they are now being eclipsed by TRIPS, the Berne Convention and 
the Paris Convention also form part of the international intellectual property 
system, and, they have had a resurgence in recent years. In addition, a proliferation 
of bilateral and plurilateral agreements as well as other newly created intellectual 
property regimes make up the now very fragmented system. 
II. THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE DECLARATION OF PATENT PROTECTION 
To lessen the burden that implementing heightened standards of intellectual 
property protection might pose for developing and lesser-developed countries, 
TRIPS provided for transition periods for these countries so that their obligations 
were deferred.7 Developing country obligations were deferred for five years, while 
lesser-developed countries’ obligations were deferred for ten years.8 These periods 
were later extended.9 When the transition periods expired, countries were 
confronted with the realities of the TRIPS Agreement and the constraints the 
 
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts: The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 319 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
7. Id. at art. 65. 
8. Id. at art. 66. 
9. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition 
Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WTO Doc. IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
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Agreement placed on state discretion to address public policy objectives and 
development concerns. States and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) shifted 
negotiations from one venue to another within the international intellectual 
property system in attempts to create policy space either within the particular 
institution or to create norms in that institution that could have spillover influence 
in other institutions, such as the WTO. In so doing, the actors (e.g., developed and 
developing countries) created conflicting principles and rules that compete with 
existing rules, hoping to supplant these rules or, at minimum, register dissent with 
the long-term goal of altering rules. The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition launched the Declaration, which appears designed to drive change in 
international patent law. 
The Declaration was drafted in collaboration with forty international patent 
scholars from twenty-five countries. The Declaration expressly aims to “clarify 
some of the regulatory options states still retain under international law, in particular 
the TRIPS Agreement,” which is now over twenty years old.10 As the Declaration 
correctly observes, either underprotection or overprotection of patents “causes a 
distortion of competition in that it prevents an efficient allocation of market 
revenues according to the competitive performance of market actors.”11 Because 
there is ambiguity where obligations end and flexibilities begin, the Declaration 
attempts to clarify the two. The Declaration begins by highlighting the flexibilities 
that states have when interpreting and implementing TRIPS provisions in their 
respective national legislation.12 
The Declaration also makes specific recommendations. For example, it 
recommends that, as a matter of policymaking, states’ protection of certain 
inventions depends on the technological field concerned.13 In other words, states 
can differentiate. The Declaration also asserts that states can shape patent policy by 
defining terms and concepts such as “invention” or “technical in nature,” and by 
defining what constitutes a lack of novelty and an inventive step.14 
A. The Purpose and Goals of the Declaration 
The Preface to the Declaration states: “In order to ensure an efficient 
functionality of the patent system as an innovation policy tool, patent rights ought 
to be defined, justified and continually reconsidered by reference to their socio-
economic benefits and costs.”15 The Declaration’s stated purpose is “to clarify the 
policy space that the ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights’ (TRIPS Agreement) leaves to national legislators and judicial authorities 
 
10. Lamping et al., supra note 2, ¶ 5. 
11. Id. ¶ 6. 
12. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. 
13. Id. ¶ 7. 
14. Id. ¶¶ 3.1–.2. 
15. Id. ¶ 1. 
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with regard to the implementation and administration of their patent systems.”16 
This is particularly important, according to the Declaration, so that intellectual 
property law can respond to changed circumstances: “Sovereign states should retain 
the discretion to adopt a patent system that best suits their technological capabilities 
as well as their social, cultural and economic needs and priorities, with the proviso 
that the exercise of such discretion must remain within the boundaries of 
international law.”17 In short, the Declaration is a statement that TRIPS (like other 
intellectual property treaties) is not a one-size-fits-all instrument and that countries 
should take advantage of the inherent flexibilities in TRIPS (and other treaties) to 
fashion laws that address countries’ particular needs and concerns. 
B. Specific Provisions 
The Declaration thus sets out to clarify boundaries of international intellectual 
property law, while also making clear the discretion that states retain. It does so in 
twelve specific provisions:  
(1) General Principles 
(2) Differentiation 
(3) Patentability, Disclosure 
(4) Scope of Protection 
(5) Exhaustion 
(6) Exceptions to the Scope of Protection 
(7) Compulsory License 
(8) Government Use 
(9) Undisclosed Information 
(10) Enforcement 
(11) Transit 
(12) Criminal Measures18 
Many of these provisions accurately describe contemporary international IP 
law, as embodied in TRIPS provisions and elsewhere.19 Still other provisions 
reasonably interpret provisions that have as yet to be interpreted by WTO jurists.20 




18. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 9, 16, 18, 20, 27, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41. 
19. The provisions on (1) Patentability, Disclosure; (2) Government Use; (3) Undisclosed 
Information; (4) Enforcement; (5) Transit; and (6) Criminal Measures appear consistent with current 
doctrine. Id. ¶¶ 9, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41. 
20. The Compulsory License provision is consistent insofar as it relates to general requirements 
of issuing compulsory licensing. Id. ¶ 27. Its position with regard to local working requirements, 
however, is not without controversy. See Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working 
Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 
365, 366–67 (2002). 
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of Protection, (3) Exceptions to the Scope of Protection, and (4) Compulsory 
License.21 The challenging thread running through each of these provisions is that, 
in fashioning domestic IP systems, states remain free to discriminate with regard to 
the field of technology. This cannot be easily reconciled with TRIPS’s non-
discrimination principle, Article 27.1, which prohibits countries from discriminating 
with respect to inventions.22 The Declaration supports this seemingly contradictory 
position by: (1) relying on the distinction between “differentiation” and 
“discrimination”; (2) applying the interpretive principle of in dubio mitius, which 
provides for a restrictive interpretation of treaty obligations in deference to state 
sovereignty; and (3) arguing that important states’ interests trump TRIPS’s non-
discrimination principle.23 These justifications are not without merit.24 They might 
even support overriding TRIPS’s non-discrimination principle, if we were writing 
on a blank slate. We are not. As explored below, the TRIPS negotiating history, 
TRIPS’s underlying goals, and WTO decisions interpreting TRIPS’s provisions 
strongly suggest that countries cannot discriminate against particular technologies. 
In this light, rather than “clarifying” TRIPS provisions, the Declaration can be read 
 
21. As mentioned above, the Compulsory License provision is at least open to debate regarding 
its view on local working requirements. As with other provisions, it also relies on differentiation, which 
is the subject of much of this Article. However, in light of the Doha Declaration, the differentiation 
argument stands on firmer ground. 
 Arguably, the Exhaustion provision is also problematic. Exhaustion regimes are classified as 
international, national, or regional. Rights owners prefer a national exhaustion regime, under which they 
can segment markets and price differentiate, i.e., determine different prices for entry into each market. 
Developing countries are generally regarded as being disadvantaged by such a system because they “lack 
a sufficient consumer base to attract market entry at the lowest possible prices.” Sean M. Flynn et. al., 
The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 130 (2012). Although the provision in the Declaration correctly states that TRIPS 
Article 6 allows states to choose the type of exhaustion regime they wish to apply (i.e., international or 
national exhaustion), it further states that TRIPS Article 27 does not prevent states from discriminating 
among industries or fields of technology. As this particular argument is made throughout the 
Declaration, there is no need to separately respond to it with regard to the exhaustion provision. 
22. I am not unsympathetic to the Declaration’s ambitions. I simply believe that the Declaration 
is a revisionist and potentially biased interpretation of TRIPS. See Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: 
TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, supra note 3, at 742 (“Discussions in the TRIPS Council have focused 
only on whether members have implemented their TRIPS obligations relating to the minimum 
standards of protection. Rather than being an agreement that balances developing countries’ concerns 
about technology transfer and promoting the public interest against developed countries’ concern for 
protecting intellectual property rights, it has instead been converted into a means of enforcing private 
rights—irrespective of the impact that protecting these rights has on sectors of vital importance to 
developing countries.”). 
23. Such interests include “environmental protection, biological diversity, health care (including 
managing the risks of pandemics), nutrition, food security, technological and scientific progress, 
education and security.” See Lamping et al., supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
24. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in 
the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 733, 751 n.73 (2001); Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, 
and Inland Water—How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, 8 Rich. 
J. Global L. & Bus. 287 (2009). 
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as an effort to reinterpret or amend TRIPS provisions.25 While reinterpretation 
might be appropriate, we should at least acknowledge it as such. The next section 
explores the premises upon which the Declaration is grounded and then questions 
whether these are well founded. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECLARATION’S PROVISIONS’ PERCEIVED 
INCONSISTENCIES 
A. Sovereignty 
At the heart of the Declaration is the principle of sovereignty and a state’s 
power to retain for itself its decision-making authority regarding matters within the 
state’s domestic jurisdiction.26 I have no quarrel with this. No other state nor the 
WTO has the right to intervene in matters over which a given state has not 
voluntarily ceded authority.27 
The reason for jealously guarding sovereign power is obvious. Treaties by their 
very nature are general. And international institutions such as the WTO must 
account for the needs of over 160 Member states with divergent policies and 
interests. Therefore, states rather than treaties are in the best position to address 
domestic concerns. Moreover, treaties are biased in favor of the “winners” of 
international negotiations. These inherent biases, coupled with the inability of 
treaties such as TRIPS to specifically address individual countries’ concerns, 
demand that countries retain discretion over all matters not expressly delegated to 
the particular organization. 
Of course, states that enter into treaties explicitly use their sovereignty to cede 
power over certain matters, thus allowing for international governance over those 
matters.28 This is uncontroversial. Such matters are generally ones that affect other 
 
25. This is consistent with “the overwhelming trend in multilateral institutions toward 
protection of TRIPS flexibilities for developing countries to promote access to affordable medications.” 
See Flynn et al., supra note 21, at 120. 
26. More particularly, the Declaration deals with vertical sovereignty, i.e., the amount of 
deference granted to states vis-à-vis international or supranational tribunals or organizations. Decision 
making can occur on vertical and horizontal levels. “The vertical allocation involves the level of social 
organization that decides regulatory policy, from the local to the global.” Gregory Shaffer, Power, 
Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
1, 140 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005). In particular, what amount of deference should 
be granted to national regulation vis-a-vis supranational rules? “The horizontal allocation of authority 
involves choices between [global] market processes, political and administrative processes, 
[international] judicial processes, and other governance mechanisms.” Id. Here, we deal exclusively with 
vertical decision making (i.e., the United States vs. the WTO). 
27. See, e.g., Henry Schermers, Different Aspects of Sovereignty, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 185, 185 (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., 2002). 
28. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication 
(Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 975 (2001) [hereinafter Bhala, Stare Decisis 
Part III ]  (“If we are serious about constructing a global economic community governed by the rule of 
law, then we ought not to grasp tenaciously the proposition that countries can enter into a set of 
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states and become matters to be solved within the international community.29 
Entering into TRIPS considerably constrained countries’ discretion with regard to 
intellectual property; the question the Declaration attempts to answer is just how 
much discretion those states retain.30 
In the original treaty negotiations, developing country governments 
successfully adopted a number of TRIPS provisions whose texts preserve states’ 
discretion. Article 1.1, for example, provides limited discretion concerning the 
implementation of TRIPS provisions: 
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members 
may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members 
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of 
this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.31 
TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 preserve more general state discretion to consider interests 
other than intellectual property. Article 7 states: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.32 
Article 8 includes TRIPS principles, which comprise (1) the ability of countries 
to adopt measures necessary to protect public health and promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological 
development, and (2) the prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights or 
 
international legal obligations as extensive as those in the GATT-WTO system, but simultaneously 
retain complete freedom under international law to do as they please.”). 
29. Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement 
Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 99, 111 n.49 (2004) [hereinafter 
Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound ]  (“Such matters may include human rights, genocide, apartheid, systematic 
killing of people, ethnic cleansing, torture, nuclear energy and weapons, labor, and the environment.”). 
30. Abdicating discretion is the price countries paid to become part of the trade regime. Id. at 
115 (“Countries became WTO members, and accepted TRIPS, not as much for what TRIPS offered 
but because they perceived that they would be worse off without the WTO”); see also Shaffer, supra note 
26, at 8 (“The risk of exclusion can induce developing countries to agree to comply with international 
rules that may contravene their interests such as the TRIPs Agreement . . . .”); see  
also Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in 
International Law Posed By the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conversation of Biodiversity, 6 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 73, 115 (1998) (“As a consequence of the Uruguay Rounds, State 
sovereignty over IPRs no longer appears especially significant in terms of ensuring that intellectual 
property protections meet domestic public interests”); Bhala, Stare Decisis Part III, supra note 28, at 
975 (“I confess an instinctive desire to respond to the sovereignty concern with a flip ‘so be it, what did 
you expect when you signed up to the WTO Agreement?’”) (emphasis omitted). 
31. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 1.1. 
32. Id. at art. 7. 
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practices that adversely affect the international transfer of technology.33 TRIPS’s 
objectives and principles assist in balancing the private rights of inventors with the 
rights of users. The provision, however, is not unqualified. Countries’ discretion 
under these Articles is constrained by the proviso that “such measures are consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement.”34 
No WTO panel has fully addressed Articles 7 and 8. But the Appellate Body 
in Canada—Term of Patent Protection held out hope that panels might yet give greater 
meaning to these Articles.35 That panel stated: “[Our ruling does not] in any way 
prejudge the applicability of Article 7 or Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement in 
possible future cases with respect to measures to promote the policy objectives of 
the WTO members that are set out in those Articles. Those Articles still await 
appropriate interpretation.”36 They may ultimately provide the discretion the 
Declaration seeks.37 
B. Differentiation, Scope, and Exceptions 
The Declaration’s more problematic provisions are those regarding 
differentiation, scope, and exceptions. According to the Declaration’s drafters, 
because of the uniqueness of various technologies, states can provide different 
levels of protection based on the technology at issue.38 If this argument is true, this 
provides states the ability to implement public policy goals and to distinguish 
protection based on the inherent differences in the technology. The Declaration 
contends that measures to accommodate these differences cannot be viewed as 
violating TRIPS’s nondiscrimination principle, TRIPS Article 27(1). Here, the 
Declaration states: “While that provision prohibits discrimination as to the field of 
technology, it does not prevent states from treating different situations 
differently.”39 Therefore, the Declaration recommends that states exclude certain 
subject matter from patentability and/or limit patent rights based on the field of 
 
33. Article 8 (Principles) provides: 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors 
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that 
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 8. 
34. Id. 
35. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Term of Patent Protection, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS170/ 
AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000). 
36. Id. ¶ 101. 
37. See Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, supra note 3, at 
743 (“WTO Panels and the AB can read Articles 7 and 8 as overarching provisions that should qualify, 
rather than be circumscribed by, other TRIPS provisions.”). 
38. See Lamping et al., supra note 2, ¶ 7. 
39. Id. 
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technology.40 This distinction between “differentiation,” on the one hand, and 
“discrimination” on the other, forms the basis upon which the Declaration’s 
conclusion rests, and underlies each of the controversial provisions. To understand 
the significance of this distinction, it is necessary to parse through statements made 
by the WTO panel in Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada-
Pharmaceuticals), where Canada made these very arguments.41 
1. Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products 
In 1998, Canada amended its patent act by enacting two targeted pieces of 
legislation. The first allowed entities other than the patent owner to use patented 
inventions to comply with regulatory review requirements, e.g., to ensure the safety 
and efficacy of pharmaceuticals before marketing them (the regulatory review 
exception).42 The purpose of this exception was to permit potential competitors to 
obtain government approval before a patent expired, even though the competing 
product could not be sold until after the patent expired.43 The second exception 
allowed generic manufacturers to make and stockpile the patented invention, e.g., 
pharmaceutical products, before the patent expired (the stockpiling exception).44 
This allowed competitors to manufacture and then stockpile patented goods during 
a certain period (e.g., six months before patent expiration). As with the first 
exception, the competing stockpiled goods could not be sold prior to the patent 
expiring. 
The European Communities (EC) filed a WTO complaint alleging that both 
regulations violated TRIPS.45 The EC argued that the regulations violated TRIPS 
 
40. “When designing exceptions and compulsory licenses, state thus remain free to discriminate 
with regard to the field of technology, provided that such action is reasonable in the light of other 
public policy goals.” See id. ¶ 3. 
41. The Declaration concedes that this interpretation is at odds with Canada—Term of Patent 
Protection, but claims that this decision was wrongly decided. Lamping et al., supra note 2, at 686. The 
three-step test has been criticized by others as well. See Flynn, supra note 21, at 139 n.108; see also 
Jonathan Griffiths et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright 
Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707 (2008). 
42. Section 55.2(1) of the Canadian Patent Act provided: 
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell the 
patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information required under any law of Canada, a province or a country other than Canada 
that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product. 
Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 2.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R 
(adopted Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Pharmaceuticals]. 
43. Id. ¶ 7.2. 
44. Section 55.2(2) of the Patent Act provides: 
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes, constructs, uses or sells a 
patented invention in accordance with subsection (1) to make, construct, or use the 
invention, during the applicable period provided for by the regulations, for the manufacture 
and storage for articles intended for sale after the date on which the term of the patent 
expires. 
Id. ¶ 2.1. 
45. Id. ¶ 3.1. 
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Article 28.1 by violating EC members’ basic patent rights (i.e., making and using the 
patented invention),46 and also that both regulations violated TRIPS Article 27.1 by 
discriminating as to the field of technology. This is the argument relevant here. 
Article 27.1 provides: 
[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology . . . patents shall be available and 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, 
the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.47 
The EC argued that the regulatory review and stockpiling exceptions discriminated 
as to the field of technology, in particular as to pharmaceuticals. 
Canada defended on two grounds: First, it relied on TRIPS Article 30’s 
exceptions to patent rights and argued that Article 30 permitted states to enact 
limited exceptions to Members’ patent rights and that Canada’s particular 
exceptions satisfied Article 30.48 Second, Canada argued that the Article 30 
exceptions were not limited by Article 27’s nondiscrimination principle.49 In other 
words, even if the stockpiling and regulatory review exceptions discriminated 
against pharmaceuticals (the regulations did not expressly do so), the exceptions 
could be upheld as valid exceptions.50 Canada argued that Articles 7 and 8 mandated 
such a construction because it would otherwise become difficult for countries to 
target particular social problems.51 As mentioned above, Articles 7 and 8 permit 
Members to balance Members’ rights and obligations52 and allow Members to adopt 
 
46. Article 28.1 provides: 
A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the 
owner’s consent from the acts of: 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product; 
where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the 
owner’s consent from the acts of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that 
process. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 28.1. 
47. Id. at art. 27.1. 
48. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42, ¶ 4.10. 
49. See id. ¶ 7.87. 
50. Id. ¶ 7.88 (“[G]overnments may discriminate when making the ‘limited’ exceptions allowed 
under Article 30, but they may not discriminate as to patent rights as modified by such exceptions.”). 
With regard to de jure discrimination, the panel concluded that the EC had not presented sufficient 
evidence to rebut Canada’s claim that the regulation was not limited to pharmaceuticals. The panel also, 
however, allowed for de facto discrimination. Id. ¶ 7.94 (“Discrimination may arise from explicitly 
different treatment, sometimes called ‘de jure discrimination,’ but it may also arise from ostensibly 
identical treatment which, due to differences in circumstances, produces differentially disadvantageous 
effects, sometimes called ‘de facto discrimination.’”). The panel found that the EC failed to prove that 
the adverse effects of the regulatory review exception were limited to pharmaceuticals or “that the 
objective indications of purpose demonstrated a purpose to impose disadvantages on pharmaceutical 
patents in particular, as is often required to raise a claim of de facto discrimination.” Id. ¶ 7.105. 
51. Id. ¶ 7.89. 
52. Article 7 (Objectives) states: 
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measures to promote the public interest, provided such measures are consistent 
with the other TRIPS provisions.53 The panel rejected both of Canada’s 
arguments.54 
The panel first interpreted TRIPS’s limitation and exceptions provision. 
Article 30 provides: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests 
of third parties.”55 The panel ruled that Article 30 imposed a tripartite test (the so-
called “three-step test”).56 An exception must (1) be “limited”; (2) “not 
unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent”; and (3) “not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interests of third parties.”57 Notably, the panel concluded that the 
elements were cumulative, since each of these elements must be met for an 
exception to pass Article 30 muster.58 As for two of the conditions (“unreasonably 
prejudice” and “unreasonably conflict”), the panel evaluated the exception 
exclusively in light of the economic impact the exception had on the right holders.59 
As to the first condition (“limited”), the panel focused on the extent the right 
holders’ legal right was curtailed.60 After defining and applying the three-step test, 
the panel upheld the regulatory review exception but found that the stockpiling 
exception violated Article 30.61 
In rejecting Canada’s second argument, that states could discriminate when 
making exceptions to patent rights, the panel stated (and Canada acknowledged) 
that the primary purpose of Article 27 was to eliminate discrimination against 
pharmaceuticals. More specifically, Article 27 sought to (1) eliminate the earlier state 
practice of either denying protection altogether, and (2) prohibit states from 
automatically granting compulsory licenses on patented pharmaceuticals.62 The 
panel noted that there was no way to milk Canada’s construction from the language 
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 7. 
53. Id. at art. 8. 
54. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42. 
55. The three-step test arises from the Berne Convention, Article 9.2. There are some 
differences between Article 9.2 and TRIPS Article 30, most notably that Berne applies to copyright and 
only to the reproduction right. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
art. 9.2, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
56. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42, ¶ 7.20. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. ¶ 7.31. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. ¶¶ 7.36, 7.50. 
62. Id. ¶ 7.90. 
Harris_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:36 AM 
2016] THE POWER OF IDEAS 357 
of Article 27 or Article 30.63 The panel pointed out that Article 27 prohibits 
discrimination as to the enjoyment of patent rights, without qualifying that term.64 
Moreover, Article 30 explicitly states that exceptions are “to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent.”65 Nothing in either provision indicated that exceptions were 
intended to be exempt from the non-discrimination principle.66 The panel 
concluded: “A discriminatory exception that takes away enjoyment of a patent right 
is discrimination as much as discrimination in the basic rights themselves.”67 
The panel also rejected Canada’s policy arguments. With regard to being able 
to target particular social problems by discriminating as to fields of technology, the 
panel suggested that the prohibition against discrimination was specifically intended 
to guard against states relying on such concerns: 
Moreover, to the extent the prohibition of discrimination does limit the 
ability to target certain products in dealing with certain of the important 
national policies referred to in Articles 7 and 8.1, that fact may well 
constitute a deliberate limitation rather than a frustration of purpose. It is 
quite plausible, as the EC argued, that the TRIPS Agreement would want 
to require governments to apply exceptions in a non-discriminating 
manner, in order to ensure that governments do not succumb to domestic 
pressures to limit exceptions to areas where right holders tend to be foreign 
producers.68 
This acknowledgment seriously undermined Canada’s (and other Members’) ability 
to consider legitimate interests in fashioning patent exceptions. Significantly, 
however, the panel qualified this statement: “Article 27 prohibits only 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology, and whether 
products are imported or produced locally. Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide 
exceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product areas.”69 The panel’s 
conclusion that the three-step test must be applied cumulatively, rather than as 
separate and independent requirements, as well as the panel’s definition of the 
specific elements, heavily favor rights owners.70 As other scholars have noted, this 
 





67. Id. The panel found that even though Canada’s regulatory review exception did not explicitly 
apply to pharmaceutical products (de jure discrimination), the discriminatory impact (de facto 
discrimination) could justify a finding that the exception violated Article 27. 
68. Id. ¶ 7.92. 
69. Id. (emphasis added). 
70. See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT (2008), http://
www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/937 [https://perma.cc/V77A-NKF9] (tracing the history of the 
three-step test, Hugenholtz and Okediji make a convincing argument that the WTO panel in Section 
110 changed the very nature of the test by focusing more on the rightsholders’ interest, rather than 
users’ interest); id. at 18 (arguing that the WTO incorrectly interpreted the three-step test); id. at 17 
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result was not preordained.71 The panel could have, for example, adopted a 
“holistic” approach that offered Members more flexibility by envisioning the three 
“steps” merely as factors that a tribunal could weigh (similar to the fair use factors 
in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act).72 The Declaration’s attempt to reinterpret 
the three-step test is discussed below. Here, we take a closer look at the 
Declaration’s differentiation argument. 
That argument depends on a fundamental but simple premise: differentiation 
is different from discrimination. It is tempting to say this is mere semantics. But it 
is not. The distinction paves the way for countries to provide different forms of 
protection (or no protection) for pharmaceutical products, i.e., as necessary to 
promote technological development and socioeconomic developments, without 
restrictions. The Declaration’s Drafters are surely right that differentiation and 
discrimination are not the same.73 Moreover, the Canada-Pharmaceutical panel’s 
acknowledgment that the nondiscrimination principle does not limit states’ ability 
to target certain products for bona fide reasons supports this view.74 It is not 
surprising, then, that the panel decision has engendered strong responses. One set 
of commentators views the decision restrictively, requiring absolute technological 
neutrality and prohibiting all forms of differential treatment as discriminatory.75 
 
(“During its transformation from a norm of international copyright to a norm of international trade 
law, the focus of the test has shifted from the interests of the author to those of the right holder. This 
paradigm shift is not without consequences; it brings to the foreground the commercial interests of 
intermediaries (‘right holders’), while downplaying the interests of the authors.”) (emphasis in original). 
71. Id. 
72. See id. at 22 (conceding that it “takes more liberties with the wording of the provision” 
although advocating for such an approach, and comparing such an approach with the fair use factors 
in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act and arguing this would “do more justice”). 
73. See also Graeme Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying without Discriminating: 
Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 445 (2007) 
(providing three examples where the authors claim states should be able to diversify without 
discriminating in violation of TRIPS Article 27). Two of these I do not contest. 
74. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42, ¶ 7.94 (“The ordinary meaning of the word 
‘discriminate’ . . . certainly extends beyond the concept of differential treatment. It is a normative  
term, pejorative in connotation, referring to results of the unjustified imposition of differentially 
disadvantageous treatment.”). 
75. See Jonathan Michael Berger, Tripping over Patents: AIDS, Access to Treatment and the 
Manufacturing of Scarcity, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 157, 199 (2002) (noting that in response to the inquiry 
“whether it is permissible to design provisions such as a compulsory licensing scheme solely in relation 
to pharmaceutical products,” the pharmaceutical industry argues that Article 27.1 “prohibits member 
states from adopting compulsory licensing regimes that specifically target the pharmaceutical industry 
without being applicable to other sectors”); Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the 
BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 346 n.198 (2006); Robert Chalmers, Evergreen or Deciduous? 
Australian Trends in the “Evergreening” of Patents, 30 MELB. U.L. REV. 29, 47 (2006) (“Arguably these 
[anti-evergreening] provisions [in Australia’s Therapeutic Goods Act], in mounting additional hurdles 
for patentees seeking to enforce their rights over pharmaceutical inventions, do discriminate in relation 
to the enjoyment of patent rights.”); Natalie M. Derzko, A Local and Comparative Analysis of the 
Experimental Use Exception—Is Harmonization Appropriate?, 44 IDEA 1, 48 (2003) (noting that 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is an experimental use exception for regulatory submissions in the United States and 
applies solely to the “development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates 
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Another set of commentators views the decision as less restrictive, allowing for 
different rules for different technological inventions so long as the rules are based 
on legitimate reasons. The majority of commentators appear to adopt this less 
restrictive view that differentiation only amounts to discrimination when there is no 
justifiable reason for the dissimilar treatment.76 
In the abstract, the conventional (i.e., less restrictive) differentiation argument 
is compelling; however, when placed in context and framed in light of TRIPS 
negotiating history, the argument looks less so. Yet, there might be an unexplored 
middle ground. Although it may prove less satisfying than either of the two 
extremes, such a middle ground appears justified based on the negotiating history, 
and is also consistent with the panel’s decision. This middle ground posits that most 
differentiation (i.e., justifiable discrimination) is permitted under TRIPS. But 
differentiation with regard to pharmaceutical products may not be. This requires 
closer inspection.77 
2. General Principles of Treaty Interpretation 
Treaty interpretation begins with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). VCLT Article 31 requires that in interpreting TRIPS, terms must 
be given their ordinary meaning,78 and TRIPS must be interpreted in context and in 
 
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products,” and may therefore violate Article 
27.1’s mandate that patent rights be enjoyable without discrimination as to field of technology) 
(emphasis added); Bryan Mercurio, The Impact of the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement on 
the Provision of Health Services in Australia, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1051, 1094 (2005) (“[T]he 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (IFPMA) felt that [the Australian 
government’s amendments to the United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Bill restricting 
drug manufacturer infringement claims] violated the TRIPS Agreement by discriminating against 
pharmaceutical patent holders and dissuading holders from seeking to protect and enforce their rights.”) 
(footnote omitted); LiLan Ren, Comment, A Comparison of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and Foreign Statutes 
and an Analysis of § 1498(a)’s Compliance with TRIPS, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1696 (2005) (arguing 
House Bills 1708 and 3235 “as currently written could face opposition because they only regulate 
pharmaceutical and safety-related patents” and should be changed to cover all fields of technology to 
“avoid any issue of discrimination” under TRIPS Article 27.1). 
76. See Berger, supra note 75, at 200; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective 
Assessment in the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 77, 85 (2005) [hereinafter Abbott, New Era] (“[Article 27.1] does not, however, mean that a 
patent with respect to an Internet search engine must be treated the same as a patent on a steam 
turbine . . . Inventions are not neutral with respect to field of technology. The invention of a new variety 
of disease-resistant rice has fundamentally different implications than the development of a new 
microprocessor or machine tool.”); Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing 
Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 7 [hereinafter Correa, Public Health] (“[D]ifferential 
treatment does not necessarily mean discriminatory treatment, because different technologies might 
require different treatment.”). 
77. The nondiscrimination principle may require just that, regardless of differences in 
technology, as this “may well constitute a deliberate limitation” by the TRIPS drafters. Canada-
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42, ¶ 7.92. 
78. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
The text of TRIPS Article 27 is ambiguous. See also Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42, ¶ 7.94 
(finding that “discrimination” was broader than differentiating). 
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light of its object and purpose. In Canada-Pharmaceuticals, the panel found that 
“discrimination” is “a normative term, pejorative in connotation, referring to the 
unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment.”79 It also found 
that the term “extends beyond the concept of differential treatment.”80 Beyond that, 
the panel refused to provide a precise definition of the term, claiming that 
“[d]iscrimination is a term to be avoided whenever more precise standards are 
available, and, when employed, it is a term to be interpreted with caution, and with 
care to add no more precision that the concept contains.”81 I will not attempt here 
to more precisely define “discrimination” other than to suggest that the panel’s 
avoidance implies that the term is ambiguous. If so, recourse to TRIPS’s 
negotiations and the circumstances of TRIPS’s conclusion is appropriate to resolve 
such ambiguity.82 In so doing, it is hard to conclude that differentiation, even as 
separate from discrimination, would allow states to enact laws specifically targeting 
pharmaceuticals, regardless of public interests. Stated differently, while the 
differentiation argument has force when applied to new technologies or even then-
existing technologies that were not the target of tremendous and intense 
international attention, the argument presents a more challenging question when 
applied to pharmaceuticals—which were the focus of intense lobbying.83 
As recounted elsewhere,84 TRIPS was heavily influenced by the 
pharmaceutical industry with a firm mandate to protect pharmaceutical products 
internationally. Prior to TRIPS, many states—particularly developing states—
barred patents on medicines and agricultural goods as inimical to societal concerns 
 
79. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42, at ¶ 7.94. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”); Id. at art. 32 (“Recourse 
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
article 31 . . . .”). 
83. Arguably, the Doha Declaration might cut against this reading. The Doha Declaration 
allowed countries to discriminate/differentiate as against pharmaceuticals. Article 31b waives the 
domestic production requirement as to pharmaceutical product being exported to an “eligible importing 
member.” World Trade Organization, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Dec. 8, 2005, WTO 
Doc. WT/L/641. 
84. Watal notes that because the pharmaceutical sector disproportionately relies on patents to 
appropriate to itself returns on research & development and profits for future innovation, “[i]t is 
therefore no surprise that the pharmaceuticals industry was the main non-state actor influencing the 
demandeurs’ position on the patents section of the TRIPS Agreement.” Jayashree Watal, Patents: An 
Indian Perspective, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE 
URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 295, 298 ( Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman, eds., 2015); 
id. (“As the negotiations proceeded and as the United States Trade Representative notched up more 
and more bilateral successes in persuading the US’ trading partners to agree to ‘effective and adequate’ 
standards on IPRs, especially in the pharmaceuticals sector, the greater or more expansive became the 
demands of its industry.”). 
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and public benefit.85 Other states provided limited protection for such inventions, 
usually by providing a shortened protection period.86 States further distinguished 
between product patents and process patents.87 This distinction was most visible 
with respect to pharmaceutical and chemical patents.88 Through this distinction, 
states were able to issue patents on pharmaceutical and chemical processes, but deny 
protection for pharmaceutical and chemical products.89 Local manufacturers could 
thus produce patented pharmaceutical products as long as they did not use the same 
patented process.90 States certainly had legitimate reasons for distinguishing 
pharmaceutical patents (and agrochemicals and foodstuffs). Yet, these areas and the 
lack of protection were some of the most contentious and controversial issues 
during the TRIPS negotiations.91 The United States, unquestionably the driving 
force behind TRIPS, at the behest of the pharmaceutical industry, sent a strong 
message that any access to U.S. markets was inextricably linked to increased patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products.92 It would seem odd then, to say the least, 
that these TRIPS provisions should nevertheless be interpreted to allow for 
differentiation as to pharmaceutical products when the differentiation can be 
meaningfully justified.93 
 
85. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 29, and sources cited therein. 
86. See Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the 
TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 523 (1996). 
87. Harris, supra note 29, at 133. 
88. Adelman and Baldia, supra note 86, at 520. 
89. India, for example, did not provide protection for products made by processes. See 
id. at 524–25. 
90. Harris, supra note 29, at 133. 
91. Abbott, Cottier, and Gurry note that patents were the most contentious subjects of the 
Uruguay Round and solutions in the field of exclusions of patentability were of a “profoundly 
controversial nature.” Thomas Cottier, Negotiation of TRIPS Agreement Norms: The Prospects for 
Intellectual Property in GATT, in THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 686, 694–
95 (1999). To balance Article 27’s broad grant, Article 27 provides limited exceptions. Specifically, it 
provides that members may exclude inventions from patent protection when necessary to protect “ordre 
public or morality” and may exclude “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans and animals.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27, ¶¶ 2–3. Members also may exclude 
plants and animals other than micro-organisms as long as members provide for sui generis protection. 
Id. 
92. Antony Taubman, Thematic Review: Negotiating “Trade-Related Aspects” of Intellectual 
Property Rights, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE 
URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 15, 30 ( Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015). 
93. “The US negotiating team accepted proposals on what are now known as ‘flexibilities’ that 
were in line with its own domestic laws, including use of patents by or on behalf of government upon 
payment of full compensation or compulsory licenses to address anticompetitive behaviour.” Id. at 35. 
Unless the United States allowed for differentiation with regard to patent rights, it is hard to believe it 
would allow that in TRIPS. 
 It should be noted, however, that TRIPS Article 70, paragraphs 8 and 9, left countries that did 
not yet have product patents for pharmaceuticals—with not even a day of a transition period for the 
most sensitive sector in the TRIPS negotiations, since patent applications for pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural chemicals had to be permitted to be filed from 1 January 1995 onwards. Watal, supra note 
84, at 299. 
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Moreover, if this interpretation is adopted, the Declaration calls for ignoring 
or overruling Canada-Pharmaceuticals. 
IV. OVERRULING OR IGNORING WTO DECISIONS 
The Canada-Pharmaceuticals decision is not without controversy; indeed, it has 
invited a good deal of criticism.94 But ignoring the decision or disregarding it has 
serious consequences and the obstacles to overcome are significant. 
A. Arguments Against Ignoring WTO Decisions 
The strongest argument against ignoring previous WTO decisions is that these 
decisions serve as existing, binding authority. Disregarding these decisions will 
create instability within the IIL system. Despite oft-repeated (and technically 
accurate) pronouncements that WTO decisions are nonbinding and the 
international law system is not a stare decisis system, in practice many observe that 
the system is just that.95 Raj Bhala is the strongest proponent of this view. Bhala’s 
early and important work on stare decisis in WTO adjudication shows the doctrine 
in operation. In a trilogy of articles,96 Bhala persuasively argues that WTO 
adjudicators and, equally important, WTO Members regard prior WTO decisions 
as binding precedent.97 In Part I of this trilogy, Bhala argues that “the idea that stare 
decisis does not operate in international trade law is a myth borne of impure origins 
and relying on a dubious distinction between ‘binding’ and ‘non-binding’ 
precedent.”98 In Part II, Bhala demonstrates that stare decisis “resonates strongly 
throughout the WTO Appellate Body reports.”99 He declares that these reports “are 
a testament to the hypocrisy in our discourse on international trade law.”100 Time 
and again, Bhala shows that panels and the WTO Appellate Body (AB) cite and rely 
 
94. See, e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, supra note 70 (contending that contrary to 
some widely held beliefs, the available space is still quite remarkable, provided that the three-step test 
is interpreted correctly—meaning in particular that the overly cautious approach observed by the WTO 
panel in US – Copyright 190 should not be followed). 
95. To be clear, I do not argue that the WTO system should be a stare decisis system. There are 
compelling reasons it should not be. Rather, the argument here is simply that regardless of the virtues 
or shortcomings of a stare decisis system, as a practical matter states behave as if the WTO system 
operates under that principle. We should thus respond to challenges with WTO Agreements  
in this light. 
96. Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 
14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845 (1999) [hereinafter Bhala, Stare Decisis Part I]; Raj Bhala, The Precedent 
Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 1 (1999); Bhala, Stare Decisis Part III, supra note 28. 
97. Bhala, Stare Decisis Part III, supra note 28, at 978 (“Like it or not, precedent, or stare decisis, 
in the Anglo-American sense of these terms, is alive and well in the practice of the Appellate Body.”). 
98. Id. at 876. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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upon prior holdings to determine the outcome in cases.101 Bhala forcefully makes 
the case: 
While there are a variety of methodological approaches to the problem [of 
WTO adjudication], we can see this doctrine [of stare decisis] in operation 
by tracing lines of precedent on critical and recurring procedural and 
substantive issues. In both categories of issues, the lines are obvious to 
anyone who takes the time to look. Indeed, after looking, one gets a strong 
impression of the gap between the old-fashioned conventional wisdom 
about stare decisis in the international legal arena, and the reality of what is 
going on in WTO adjudication.102 
Bhala concedes that the doctrine is not one in law, but one in fact. This “de 
facto” body of law is a “body of international common law of trade emerging as a 
result of adjudication by the WTO’s Appellate Body.”103 As Bhala states: “We need 
only watch how the adjudicator comes to its conclusions to see stare decisis in 
operation.”104 
WTO Panels’ reliance on prior WTO decisions “create legitimate expectations 
among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they 
are relevant to any dispute.”105 In Part III, Bhala thus calls for the international 
community to formally embrace a de jure doctrine of stare decisis.106 
 
101. Id. at 877. He also notes that “[a]t other times, it seems that a prior holding channels or 
directs the thinking of a WTO panel or the Appellate Body in a certain direction, but does not actually 
force a conclusion. Indeed, it may give rise to a counter-stream, i.e., to efforts in a different direction.” 
He refers to this as “the flexible side of the doctrine.” Id. (“A prior holding becomes something to be 
dealt (even struggled) with and modified.”). Even unadopted panel opinions can provide “useful 
guidance” for subsequent panels. Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 13, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996) 
[hereinafter Japan–Alcohol ] . 
102. Bhala, Stare Decisis Part III, supra note 28, at 977. 
103. Bhala, Stare Decisis Part I, supra note 96, at 850. This body of law is similar to the body of 
law used by the International Court of Justice, presciently noted in the Japan–Alcohol Appellate Body 
decision in Footnote 101: 
It is worth noting that the Statute of the International Court of Justice has an explicit 
provision, Article 59, to the same effect [as the WTO in that past decisions are not binding]. 
This has not inhibited the development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case 
law in which considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible. 
Japan–Alcohol, supra note 101, at 13 n.30. See also Adrian T. L. Chua, Precedent and Principles of WTO 
Panel Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 171, 183 (1998). 
104. Bhala, Stare Decisis Part I, supra note 96, at 937. 
105. Id. (citing Japan–Alcohol, supra note 101, at 14–15) (citations omitted). Not being able to 
rely on prior cases causes uncertainty in WTO disputes. See, e.g., Joseph A. Conti, The Good Case: 
Decisions to Litigate at the World Trade Organization, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 145, 160 (2008) (“The 
emergent and developing character of WTO jurisprudence combined with the lack of formal authority 
to establish precedent creates considerable uncertainty related to determining what arguments must be 
made to construct a good legal case.”). 
106. Bhala, Stare Decisis Part III, supra note 28, at 977 (“There are simply too many strong 
rationales in favor of a de jure doctrine of stare decisis to be ignored. It is time, indeed long past time, 
for WTO Members to embrace openly a time-honored and truly grand doctrine, and thereby take 
another step towards ideal global economic governance. If they really are against lawless freedom, then 
they will do so.”). 
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Sungjoon Cho and Meredith Lewis corroborate Bhala’s understanding. Cho 
states: 
No matter how one labels WTO jurisprudence, the label itself has never 
actually bestowed compliance pull upon those decisions. Regardless of  
the label, Members perceive these precedents as well-established 
“jurisprudence” which they voluntarily observe: they cite, quote and refer 
to the AB’s precedents to substantiate and reinforce their own legal 
positions in the dispute. While not all Members abide by the WTO 
jurisprudence all the time, such breaches do not necessarily nullify the legal 
authority of the jurisprudence.107 
Moreover, Lewis observes that “panels and the Appellate Body routinely reference 
and apply previous reports. Thus there is no de jure system of precedent, but de 
facto, previous decisions are generally followed.”108 Bhala and Gantz make the same 
point: “Appellate Body members . . . realize they do not practice in a world of one-
shot appeals from initial arbitration decisions. Surely it bespeaks their perception of 
the legal world in which they operate, one typified by existing, evolving, and 
emerging precedents.”109 
Lewis welcomes this de facto stare decisis. As she observes, “[p]anels that 
diverge from previous decisions are arguably not acting in accordance with the 
objective of the dispute settlement system to provide security and predictability of 
the multilateral trading system.”110 
The AB also acknowledges the existence of the de facto system. Perhaps the 
most explicit examples are the recent AB cases involving the issue of zeroing.111 In 
 
107. Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 621, 653 (2010). 
108. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Dissent as Dialectic: Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO 
Dispute Settlement, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 23 (2012) (citations omitted). 
109. Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2001, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 457, 
499 (2002) (citations omitted). States closely adhere to WTO panel decisions. 
110. Lewis, supra note 108, at 32. In describing the Appellate Body’s ruling in Korea Beef, where 
the AB reversed the panel because the panel had “gotten it wrong,” Bhala and Gantz exclaim: 
Why would the Appellate Body care to spend nearly three pages (paragraphs 133-138) on 
the correct legal interpretation of “treatment no less favourable” if it were nothing more 
than akin to an arbitral body? To read these pages is to see common law judges, at the 
international level, in action. Indeed, why else would the Appellate Body take such pains in 
citing the body of case law that backed each sentence of the legal standard it had set in 
Japan–Alcoholic Beverages and was applying in Korea Beef ?  
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 109, at 499. See also Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-
Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 160, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) 
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)] (“Ensuring ‘security and predictability’ 
in the dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent 
reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent 
case.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
111. “Zeroing” is a methodology employed by the United States Department of Commerce in 
which it “exclude[s] transactions that have a negative dumping margin.” Edward T. Hayes, International 
Law, 55 LA. B.J. 274, 275 (2008). The dumping margin is calculated by subtracting export price from 
the domestic price; thus, a negative dumping margin is one in which the export price is higher than the 
domestic price. Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate Body Strikes Down the U.S. Zeroing Methodology 
Used in Antidumping Investigations, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (May 4, 2006), http://www.asil.org/insights/
Harris_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:36 AM 
2016] THE POWER OF IDEAS 365 
an eight-year span (2001–2009), the AB issued a series of six cases that repeatedly 
struck down the zeroing policies of WTO Members as violating the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement.112 With each decision, the AB appeared determined to 
send a message to WTO Members that zeroing, which was being used as a 
protectionist measure, was inconsistent with the WTO anti-dumping regime, which 
itself was designed to counteract a foreign producer’s pricing behavior.113 
These decisions were controversial. Many observers believed not only that the 
zeroing methodologies were valid, but also that the WTO AB’s anti-zeroing 
decisions were contrary to prior GATT decisions.  This might explain why the next 
panel to decide a zeroing complaint ignored the AB’s repeated messages. “In a 
‘shocking move,’ the panel in U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) explicitly defied the AB’s” 
newly established anti-zeroing position, instead relying on the earlier, pro-zeroing 
decisions.114 The panel justified its departure by emphasizing that panels “are not, 
strictly speaking, bound by previous Appellate Body or panel decisions that have 
addressed the same issue.”115 
As expected, this did not sit well with the AB. The AB reversed the panel’s 
findings and, in so doing, “expressed its deep concern over the panel’s rebellious 
behavior.”116 In a concurring opinion, one of the AB Members warned future panels 
not to further disobey the AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence by relying on rulings of 
the previous panels.117 The opinion is worth quoting: 
Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited by parties in 
support of legal arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are 
relied upon by panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In 
addition, when enacting or modifying laws and national regulations 
pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members take into account 
the legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in adopted 
panel and Appellate Body reports. 
 
volume/10/issue/10/wto-appellate-body-strikes-down-us-zeroing-methodology-used-antidumping 
[https://perma.cc/X8NJ-RMJF] (discussing that by using the zeroing methodology, the general 
dumping margin of a product is inflated “because the zeroing methodology precludes any offsetting 
effect of negative individual dumping margins”). 
112. See Cho supra note 107, at 629–41. 
113. Id. at 638 (“The AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence reached its climax in [Appellate Body 
Report, United States–Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R (Sep. 01, 
2007)]. The decision, which was dubbed the ‘death knell of zeroing,’ has thus far been the most 
sweeping and unyielding zeroing decisions in the WTO.”) (citation omitted). 
114. Cho, supra note 107, at 639. 
115. Panel Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
¶ 7.102, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/R, (Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.—Zeroing 
(Mexico)]. 
116. Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico), supra note 110, ¶ 162. 
117. Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology, ¶ 312, WT/DSR350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009). 
Harris_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:36 AM 
366 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:343 
At a point in every debate, there comes a time when it is more important 
for the system of dispute resolution to have a definitive outcome, than 
further to pick over the entrails of battles past.118 
Equally pragmatic, most informed observers would be concerned that 
noncompliance with prior decisions, and, particularly, deliberate and conscious 
noncompliance, would represent a threat to the system. The individual and 
collective interest in an effective dispute system would (and should) outweigh the 
interest any particular state has in any particular interpretation reached in any 
particular dispute.119 By and large, states, including nonparty states, comply with 
WTO interpretations.120 
In addition to the arguments above, disregarding WTO precedent not only 
may fail to achieve its desired goal, but may also have the perverse effect of 
strengthening that precedent. The AB zeroing cases illustrate this point. After each 
of the cases, Member states attempted to craft more creative zeroing policies, subtly 
(and sometimes not so subtly) defying the AB’s central anti-zeroing message.121 The 
AB rejected each attempt.122 More importantly, Members’ actions resulted in the 
AB taking more and more restrictive positions until it made clear that zeroing was 
intolerable.123 As Sungjoon Cho states: “[T]he judicial rulemaking on zeroing was 
the AB’s purposeful mission of institutionalizing a ‘proper test’ which would shrink 
the domestic government’s administrative discretion and thus render a pro-zeroing 
interpretation ‘impermissible’ under Article 17.6(ii) in this particular anti-dumping 
issue.”124 The relevant fear here is that a WTO panel, and of more concern the AB, 
might find that a developing state’s attempt to manipulate patent requirements 
under a subterfuge of a textual ambiguity in Article 27 requires intervention. Rather 
than highlighting discretion, such a plan may ossify the nondiscrimination principle 
and the current interpretation of the three-step test. 
This ossification may already have occurred. WTO adjudicators have 
addressed the proper interpretation of TRIPS exceptions and limitations three 
separate times, and each time the panel respected and abided by the prior 
interpretation. First was the panel interpretation of patent exceptions in Canada-
Pharmaceuticals itself.125 Months later, a second panel ruled on permissible 
 
118. Cho, supra note 107, at 655 (citing Appellate Body Report, U.S.–Zeroing (Mexico), supra  
note 110, ¶ 160). 
119. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued Existence and Application of 
Zeroing Methodology, supra note 117, ¶ 312. 
120. See David Epstein et al., Implementing the Agreement: Partisan Politics and WTO Dispute 
Settlement, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 121, 124 ( James C. Hartigan ed., 2009). 
121. See Cho, supra note 107, at 633–40. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 640. 
124. Id. at 647. 
125. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42. 
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exceptions for copyrights in United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act.126 
Third, a panel five years later ruled on permissible exceptions to trademarks in 
European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.127 The TRIPS provisions allowing for exceptions 
to copyrights (Article 13) and trademarks (Article 17) are nearly identical in text and 
structure to the provision governing patents (Article 30).128 These latter two cases 
followed the Canada-Pharmaceuticals holding.129 In each case, the WTO found that 
the exceptions involved cumulative elements. U.S. – Section 110 and Canada-
Pharmaceuticals were decided close in time, which might account for the similarity 
of the decisions. But European Communities – Protection of Trademarks was decided 
five years later, which gave the WTO time to fully consider and to rethink its 
position. Nonetheless, it interpreted the trademark exceptions in the same manner 
as the previous panels.130 It appears the WTO has spoken on the issue, with 
European Communities – Protection of Trademarks perhaps sounding the death knell 
for the more holistic interpretation advanced by some commentators regarding 
TRIPS’s exceptions. 
 
126. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTO Doc. WT/
DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000). 
127. Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WTO Doc. WT/DS174/R (adopted Mar. 15, 2005). 
128. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations or 
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”); id. at 
art. 17 (“Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair 
use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the 
owner of the trademark and of third parties.”). 
129. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42. 
130. If one were so inclined, one might be able to distinguish the EC-Protection of Trademarks 
opinion from the earlier WTO opinions as a more lenient and permissive opinion concerning Member 
discretion. The panel did note that Article 17 covering trademark exceptions differed from Articles 13 
and 30 covering copyright exceptions and patent exceptions, respectively. The panel stated:  
The structure of Article 17 differs from that of the other exceptions provisions to which the 
parties refer [Articles 13 and 30] . . . [U]nlike these other provisions, Article 17 contains no 
reference to “conflict with a [or the] normal exploitation,” no reference to “unreasonable 
prejudice” to the “legitimate interests” of the right holder or owner, and it not only refers to 
the legitimate interests of third parties but treats them on par with those of the right holder.  
EC-Protection of Trademarks, ¶ 7.649. The panel thus explained that “whilst it is instructive to refer to 
the interpretation by two previous panels of certain shared elements found in Articles 13 and 30, it is 
important to interpret Article 17 according to its own terms.” Id. 
On the other hand, as relevant here, the EC-Protection of Trademarks’ panel interpreted Article 17 as 
requiring a tripartite test, and also defined common terms in precisely the same manner as did the 
previous panels. See id. ¶ 7.650 (“The panel agrees with the view of the Panel in Canada-Pharmaceutical 
Patents, which interpreted the identical term in Article 30 . . . .”), ¶ 7.663 (“We agree with the following 
view of the Panel in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, which interpreted the term ‘legitimate interests’ of 
a patent owner and third parties in the context of Article 30 . . . .”) Thus, while there is certainly a 
difference in how the EC-Protection of Trademarks’ panel defined trademark exceptions, that difference 
is, arguably, attributable to the difference in language among the various exception provisions, rather 
than an attempt to interpret the provision more favorably than prior panels.  
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Finally, TRIPS was developed through a political process of negotiation 
among states. Rewriting the rules, or ignoring consistent decisions and instead 
interpreting provisions that are inconsistent with this negotiation process, interferes 
with those expressions of state sovereignty. Doing so might unfairly undo 
agreements achieved during the negotiation process.131 Some would argue that this 
would amount to nothing more than judicial activism by the AB or WTO panels.132 
The negotiation history tends to confirm this risk. The provisions concerning 
pharmaceuticals, and the related exceptions and limitations, were some of the more 
controversial TRIPS provisions. Again, prior to TRIPS, many states—particularly 
developing states—(1) barred patents on medicines and agricultural goods for the 
public’s benefit, (2) provided a shortened protection period, and (3) distinguished 
between product patents and process patents.133 By requiring Member countries to 
provide patent protection in “all fields of technology,” Article 27’s subject matter 
provision prevents states from excluding pharmaceuticals.134 These pharmaceutical 
exclusions were “profoundly controversial,”135 but the United States firmly 
considered them “nonnegotiable.”136 Moreover, the newly expanded definition of 
patentable subject matter did away with the product/process distinction (“patents 
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology.”)137 
 
131. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade 
Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 19 (2001); Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of Linkage, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 126 (2002); Debra Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum—A Commentary, 
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 135 (2002); see also Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, 
FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011). 
132. Such activism “is incompatible with democratic accountability and WTO legitimacy, which 
are threatened because: (1) AB judges are not elected; (2) AB decisions are not readily reversible by 
democratically accountable means; and (3) member states are deprived of their right to participate in 
policy decisions.” Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, supra note 3, 
at 717; see Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 342 
(1999); see also Patrick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of 
Self-Restraint, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 353, 365 (2002). The fear here appears to be that while WTO 
dispute resolution involves ensuring that members comply with WTO rules, it also involves quasi-
legislation, which should be limited to matters that WTO members have already considered and 
negotiated. Id. at 339 (“Of course, dispute resolution plays two roles. First . . . dispute resolution is 
necessary to the application of legislation. In this regard, dispute resolution is not important for its own 
sake but as the place where legislation becomes binding and effective. Legislation without adjudication 
at least raises greater concerns regarding the application and effectiveness of the legislation . . . . Second, 
dispute resolution . . . inevitably interprets and expands upon legislation. In a common law system, 
indeed, dispute resolution amounts unabashedly to a type of legislation.”). 
133. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound, supra note 29, at 138–39. 
134. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27. 
135. Thomas Cottier, Negotiation of TRIPS Agreement Norms: The Prospects for Intellectual 
Property in GATT, in THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM, supra note 91, at 
694–95 (noting that patents were the most contentious subjects of the Uruguay Round and solutions 
in the field of exclusions of patentability were of a “profoundly controversial nature”). 
136. Id. 
137. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27. To balance this broad grant, Article 27 provides 
limited exceptions. Specifically, it provides that members may exclude inventions from patent 
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Against this backdrop of hard-fought gains, rewriting or reinterpreting 
TRIPS’s exceptions to allow countries policy space to differentiate amongst 
pharmaceutical patents could be institutionally improper and at odds with the rule 
of law approach adopted by the WTO, or it might amount to judicial activism; at 
the very least, it could prove challenging.138 
B. Arguments in Favor of Ignoring WTO Decisions 
The arguments for adhering to WTO decisions are strong, but they are not 
insurmountable. First, all of the exceptions cases (Canada-Pharmaceuticals, U.S. – 
Section 110, and European Communities – Protection of Trademarks) are panel decisions, 
as opposed to AB rulings. There is, arguably, a potential distinction between 
disregarding a panel report and an AB report.139 From a systemic perspective, the 
more worrisome practice is the failure to adhere to decisions vertically;140 it is hard 
to justify ignoring an AB ruling.141 When a ruling is made by “just” a panel there is 
at least a colorable claim that the AB might interpret an Article differently and, as 
such, the claim might not be foreclosed until the AB opines. After all, the reversal 
rate of panels is relatively high. The Ministerial Conference and the TRIPS Council 
have final and exclusive authority as to what TRIPS provisions mean, and they have 
the authority to interpret Articles 27 and 30 in the manner suggested by the 
Declaration. 
Second, Bhala and others’ strong arguments regarding a de facto stare decisis 
WTO system notwithstanding, Members have not taken up Bhala’s call to establish 
a formal de jure system, so the system remains in principle one of non-binding 
precedent. As the WTO states: “As in other areas of international law, there is no 
rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement according to which previous rulings 
bind panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent cases.”142 Accordingly, panel 
 
protection when necessary to protect “ordre public or morality” and may exclude “diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals.” Id. Members also may 
exclude “plants and animals other than micro-organisms” as long as members provide for sui generis 
protection. Id.; see also Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound, supra note 29, at 132–33. 
138. See Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 42, at 154 (“[T]he three limiting conditions attached 
to Article 30 testify strongly that the negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Article 30 to bring 
about what would be equivalent to renegotiation of the basis balance of the Agreement.”). 
139. See Lewis, supra note 108, at 10–11. 
140. Id. 
141. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 107, at 654 (“A WTO panel, as a lower tribunal, is not entitled  
to question the validity of a constitutional decision rendered by the AB—a constitutional tribunal.”); 
id. at 655 (citing Panel Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, ¶ 161 WTO Doc. WT/DS344/R (adopted Dec. 20, 2007)) (“[A] panel’s defiance is against  
the hierarchical division of labor in DSU under which only the AB can ‘uphold, modify or reverse’ 
panels’ legal interpretations.”). 
142. Legal Status of Adopted/Unadopted Reports in Other Disputes, WTO, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm [https://perma.cc/
76W3-V4XQ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
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dispute settlement reports and AB reports, if adopted, bind only the parties to the 
dispute and do not bind other WTO Members.143 
The idea of disregarding prior reports is not novel.144 Panels and the AB have 
ignored prior WTO decisions.145 In the AB zeroing decisions described above, the 
AB arguably disregarded prior GATT precedent in finding that the zeroing 
regulations were impermissible.146 Admittedly, this was not done lightly. Cho calls 
this type of practice “constitutional lawmaking.”147 According to Cho, this was 
necessary because the AB “recognized the structural damage that zeroing, if left 
unchecked, could inflict on the global trading system through the propagation of 
antidumping measures.”148 “Constitutional lawmaking” is appropriate in narrow 
circumstances, depending on the nature of the subject matter and the “topicality” 
of the issue. Zeroing and antidumping measures fit the bill because zeroing was 
widely used as a protectionist measure, replacing traditional trade barriers such as 
tariffs. Cho is careful to point out, however, that “constitutional lawmaking” is not 
always appropriate.149 He is reluctant to recommend it beyond the zeroing instance. 
However, there are strong warrants for constitutional lawmaking in the 
context of IIP. As with zeroing, TRIPS limitation and exception provisions are 
critical to the underlying objectives and principles expressly identified in TRIPS. 
Moreover, the limitations provisions significantly affects states’ ability to address 
serious public health and policy concerns. The restrictive nature of the TRIPS 
limitations and exceptions interpretation and the futility of the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach might substantiate a future panel/AB decision recognizing the holistic 
approach for limitations. 
A final argument for disregarding a WTO panel decision relies on changed 
circumstances after the adoption of TRIPS. Under narrow circumstances, changed 
circumstances may relieve parties of their treaty obligations.150 The term rebus sic 
stantibus is a treaty law doctrine that addresses a fundamental change occurring with 
regard to those circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and 
not foreseen by the parties. Article 62(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties limits application of this principle: 
 
143. See Japan–Alcohol, supra note 101, at 13. 
144. Cho, supra note 107, at 624, 652–53. 
145. Id. 
146. See Cho, supra note 107 at 624 (“This Article construes the AB’s anti-zeroing position not 
as a simple jurisprudential change but as a more serious judicial revolution, which is tantamount to 
‘constitutional lawmaking’ in its determined endeavor to contain WTO members’ manipulative use of 
zeroing methodologies under the subterfuge of the textual ambiguity of the relevant WTO norms.”). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. “[T]his Article captures and theorizes one notable constitutional dynamic as it emerges in 
the WTO.” Id. at 626 (emphasis in original). 
150. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) (entered into 
force Jan. 27, 1980). 
Harris_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:36 AM 
2016] THE POWER OF IDEAS 371 
A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty unless: (a) the existence of 
those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the 
parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is 
radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under 
the treaty.151 
 The argument here is that in the over twenty years since TRIPS was adopted, 
circumstances have changed so dramatically that Members should be excused from 
their obligations. Global revolutions in communication and information exchange 
were not fully anticipated or appreciated in 1994. The Internet is a notable example. 
Since then, intellectual property has transformed from a property right encouraging 
future endeavors into a vehicle that affects and reaches into previously unforeseen 
areas as diverse and fundamental as public health; the environment; biotechnology; 
and digital communication, reproduction, and distribution. Unfortunately, as 
compelling as they may be, these new dimensions of international intellectual 
property may provide an inadequate reason to relieve a state from its obligations. 
Not once in the history of international law has a state successfully invoked changed 
circumstances to avoid prior commitments. 
In the end, while there is some room available for differentiation, consistent 
with the WTO decisions, the arguments favoring decisional consistency, supported 
by the TRIPS negotiating history, overwhelm contrary arguments of unfettered 
discretion to differentiate. Therefore, we should look to other institutional 
mechanisms for change. 
V. DYNAMIC MODES OF IIP LAWMAKING 
My conclusion against unfettered differentiation is troublesome, particularly 
from a public policy perspective. While there are strong rule of law benefits from 
institutional stability and credibility from international treaties and WTO decisions 
that are binding, viewed from the public policy optic, states should certainly have 
wide discretion to fashion intellectual property regimes to respond to their current 
conditions and local needs. Moreover, states should have the power to change the 
existing regime to account for changed circumstances. The inability to treat 
inventions that affect various sectors within a state differently can frustrate this 
power. Yet, this conclusion seems inescapable as a matter of treaty interpretation. 
Regardless, this conclusion does not ineluctably lead to the entrenchment or 
privileging of economic and private rights over other interests. The remainder of 
this Article thus examines ways in which the Declaration might lessen the rigidity 
of TRIPS provisions in other ways. The following sections propose that the 
Declaration can still act as a catalyst for change by using the fragmentation of the 
international intellectual property system, as well as by appreciating the power of 
ideas. 
 
151. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62(1), opened for signature May 23, 1969,  
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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A. The Power of Ideas 
Intellectual property scholars are quite familiar with the power of ideas. 
Indeed, patent law is premised on the protection of new and useful ideas. Here, 
however, ideas are used in a different context. Ideas here are not protectable subject 
matter; rather, they are a foundation for civil disobedience. They are the bedrock of 
social movements. And here, ideas are the basis upon which a different view of 
TRIPS can emerge, one that takes into account the differing levels of economic, 
social, and technological development of its Members. More particularly, the 
Declaration introduces ideas and norms that countries can adopt to design IP 
systems that promote welfare and allow for the diverging needs of Member states. 
To borrow from Professor Kapcynski, the Declaration can “reframe” the debate 
about IP protection such that the international community no longer views IP from 
a mere economic perspective in which IP rights are good and more IP is better, but 
rather one in which IP is framed in light of human rights, public health, and one of 
any number of inputs into a system fostering economic and technological 
development.152 At bottom, the system is and should be seen as allowing for the 
growth of all states, and not solely benefiting the “haves” but also the “have nots.” 
To be sure, this reframing is already well under way. Mechanisms both within 
and outside the WTO contribute to the ongoing development of IIP and have 
allowed groups to successfully translate their ideas and interpretations into concrete 
outcomes. This has been fueled by changes in the international lawmaking process. 
Examining these changes in lawmaking may be helpful in identifying concrete 
methods or possible avenues the drafters of the Declaration might pursue. 
B. Changes in Lawmaking Activity 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the adoption of 
TRIPS comprised a monumental moment in international intellectual property. A 
dramatic departure from the prior international intellectual property framework, 
TRIPS was the most comprehensive and far-reaching international intellectual 
property treaty concluded at that time (and since). Rather than address a single 
intellectual property area, TRIPS covered a wide range of forms of intellectual 
property, including copyrights, trademarks, patents, undisclosed information, 
semiconductors, and geographical indications, among others. In addition, by 
bringing intellectual property within the institutional framework of the multilateral 
trading regime, TRIPS subjected intellectual property for the first time to the most-
favored-nation principle and also to detailed provisions concerning the 
administration and enforcement of intellectual property rights, backed with an 
effective enforcement mechanism not previously seen in international intellectual 
policy. 
 
152. Amy Kapcynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 YALE L. J. 804 (2008). 
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Even as TRIPS transformed the IIP scene, however, it was only the beginning. 
As Anthony Taubman, the Director of the Intellectual Property Division of the 
WTO exclaims: “The period since the Agreement entered into force has 
undoubtedly been the most active, the most intensively debated and the most 
geographically and economically diverse phase of intellectual property law-making 
and policy-making processes ever experienced.”153 
Put simply, the international intellectual property regime has become 
increasingly complex. This complexity is characterized by competing institutions; 
bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral treaties; and numerous actors, including 
traditional and new domestic and transnational actors. Maneuvering through this 
fragmented system can be complicated, yet also strategic. When states and nonstate 
actors become dissatisfied with institutional policies, there are an increasing number 
of avenues they can pursue. As the international intellectual property system has 
changed, so too have these avenues. Institutions, states, nonstate actors, and other 
nongovernment organizations use these new and different strategies to promote 
policies designed to both challenge and alter the status quo. These strategies include: 
(1) The “traditional” method of changing existing norms from within the 
particular organization (e.g., changing WTO norms within the WTO) 
(2) Relocating to a more favorable forum (i.e., “regime shifting”) 
(3) Establishing norms outside of the existing structure with the purpose 
of incorporating those norms into that structure (e.g., creating 
copyright norms outside of either WIPO or the WTO and then having 
either institution adopt those norms) 
(4) Creating norms in a competing institution with the goal of having those 
norms incorporated into the target institution (“competitive regime 
creation”) 
(5) Creating norms for issues not previously existing in any particular 
structure and incorporating these norms into an existing structure 
(e.g., by grouping banking, telecommunications, finance, etc. as 
“services” and then characterizing these as “trade related” so as to 
incorporate them into GATT/WTO). 
The objectives underlying these modes of lawmaking have been to change the 
policies, rules, or procedures of various organizations and to do so customarily 
through strong pressure from industry, states, NGOs, and others. Moreover, 
different organizations and players have affected both vertical and horizontal 
governance structures by organizing at all levels of government (i.e., local, national, 
and international). Examining the hows and whys of these shifts in strategy can 
inform suitable options with respect to IIP patent exceptions. 
 
153. Taubman, supra note 92, at 16 (“[T]he period since the Agreement was concluded has 
unquestionably been the most dynamic and challenging time ever for the IP system in general.”). 
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1. Creating and Incorporating New Issues 
The more recent changes to international lawmaking for IIP can be seen as 
early as the 1980s in the context of services that were governed by issue-specific 
domestic regulatory schemes.154 The interaction of different groups led to a 
different governance structure, i.e., an international trade regime and the rules 
embodied in GATT. This process illustrates a mode of lawmaking wherein an issue 
without an existing structure (services) is created and then incorporated into an 
existing structure (GATT/WTO). 
Until the 1986 GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, services were treated as 
discrete activities, and no comprehensive regulatory system existed to govern 
them.155 Services were within the exclusive province of national regulation. 
Consequently, a comprehensive regime was also absent at the international level. 
The institutions and organizations responsible for regulating services did so on an 
industry-by-industry basis, and these institutions and their constituencies were 
staunchly resistant to open domestic competition, to say nothing of global 
competition.156 In the 1980s, a new idea emerged, one that revolutionized trade and 
services by linking the two. The first step in this process was to establish that 
services as diverse as telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, 
shipping, management consulting, advertising, construction, education, 
entertainment, massages, and haircuts shared a common interest: trade. The novel 
idea advanced was not only that services shared a common interest in trade, but also 
that comprehensive global liberalization of trade would benefit each of the service 
industries.157 
William Drake and Kalypso Nicolaïdis detail this transformation at great 
length. According to them, this shift to a trade discourse “was a revolution in social 
ontology: it redefined how governments thought about the nature of services.”158 
It required “a fundamental change in mind-set” to persuade industry participants 
and governments that the benefits of liberalized trade would outweigh concomitant 
costs.159 
The process began by establishing an epistemic two-tiered community of 
experts. The first tier included personnel from institutions such as governments, 
international agencies, and private firms. These individuals were important because 
 
154. See, e.g., William J. Drake & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: 
“Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round, 46 INT’L ORG. 37 (1992). 
155. Id. at 44 (“[M]ost governments simply lumped services into a broad ‘tertiary’ sector 
comprising everything that was not agriculture and manufacturing.”). 
156. Id. 
157. Of course liberalization would affect different industries in different ways, but so long as 
each industry was convinced that trade would lead to benefits, a grouping of a “services community” 
could be accomplished. 
158. Drake and Nicolaïdis, supra note 154, at 38. 
159. Id. (“It took a fundamental change of mind-set to believe that the long-term benefits of 
trade liberalization could outweigh the substantial adjustment costs and risks involved.”). 
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they worked for organizations that had direct interests in alternative policy 
solutions.160 The second tier included individuals with a more intellectual focus, 
such as academics, lawyers, industry specialists, and journalists. This second tier 
could legitimize the first tier’s view because its members appeared relatively 
unbiased and were organizationally independent. To external policymakers, their 
views were “scientifically objective” and “susceptible to truth tests.”161 They were 
also more likely to seek solutions and pursue outcomes that benefited the global 
community as a whole, rather than individual entities or industries.162 
In tracing the history of services’ inclusion in GATT, Drake and Nicolaïdis 
identify three distinct stages: (1) formation of the epistemic community; (2) 
consolidation of issues that could then be presented to the global community via 
placement on the Uruguay Round negotiation agenda; and (3) the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, where the issues were further discussed, refined and eventually 
adopted.163 I will refer to these as the national stage, the international stage, and the 
implementation stage. 
At the national stage, a community of experts was established. The focus of 
this stage was “consciousness raising.”164 The formed community framed issues and 
decided who got a seat at the table. They fostered dialogue with international 
counterparts, thus growing the epistemic community in both size and diversity but 
also maintaining to a large extent the community’s common beliefs, conceptual 
framework, and agenda.165 The community was then eventually able to exert 
influence on policymakers. 
The international stage involved the epistemic community’s dissemination and 
refinement of its ideas with a feedback loop from an increasing number of 
participants.166 Issues were consolidated, and eventually the first-tier community 
introduced “trade in services” as a new discussion topic within GATT.167 The 
introduction of this new concept resulted in a strong demand for basic information 
about the nature and extent of services.168 It also required governments to obtain 
particularized knowledge and strategic input on how liberalization would affect their 
countries.169 In response, the community provided studies and reports containing 
more detailed assessments on critical issues, offering further input, and solidifying 
positions.170 
 
160. Id. at 39. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 38. 
164. Id. at 41–42. 
165. Cf. Kapcynski, supra note 152, at 883–84. 
166. Drake & Nicolaïdis, supra note 154, at 62. 
167. Id. at 53. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 54. 
170. Id. at 55–56. 
Harris_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:36 AM 
376 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:343 
Understandably, at the implementation stage the process considerably slowed, 
as developing countries were (1) wary of the comparative disadvantage of including 
services, (2) skeptical of the industrialized countries’ motives, and (3) concerned that 
including services would detract from issues of greater importance to them.171 
Through communication from first-tier and second-tier members, a coherent and 
convincing body of thought developed, which made those who opposed including 
services in trade negotiations appear to stand “on a shaky intellectual ground.”172 
The implementation stage is characterized by governments negotiating final 
commitments.173 Here, in contrast with the previous stages, the epistemic 
community’s influence declined, and traditional power and bargaining dynamics 
surfaced.174 Nevertheless, the community’s work set the stage for these 
negotiations, and governments adopted one policy from the range of options 
presented by the community.175 
From this short summary of the process, some events are noteworthy. First, 
because the idea of services relating to trade was novel, top policymakers lacked 
both organized information regarding the nature and volume of services 
transactions as well as experts to turn to. The epistemic community filled this 
void.176 The second striking aspect of the process was the epistemic community’s 
access to top policymakers, both through formal and informal channels. While this 
access was primarily accomplished through the first-tier community, the steady and 
continuous feedback among and between the first- and second-tier communities 
resulted in the second-tier community’s ideas reaching these top policymakers.177 
The level of influence depended heavily on access to these top policymakers.178 
2. “Contested Multilateralism” 
Other forms of lawmaking have emerged with respect to other international 
regimes. “Contested multilateralism” is a term coined by Julia Morse and Robert 
Keohane to describe situations where states, multilateral organizations, and 
nonstate actors use multilateral institutions to challenge the rules or norms of 
existing or newly created multilateral institutions.179 When the multilateral 
 
171. Id. at 57–58. 
172. Id. at 64–65. 
173. Id. at 65. 
174. Id. at 66. 
175. Id. at 41. Policy options were not always or even frequently adopted in whole; rather, 
governments often modified proposals. Still, the community’s influence was evident. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 40–41. 
178. Id. at 41. 
179. Contested Multilateralism, supra note 4, at 385 (“‘Contested multilateralism’ describes the 
situation that results from the pursuit of strategies by states, multilateral organizations, and non-state 
actors to use multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge the rules, practices, or 
missions of existing multilateral institutions. It occurs when coalitions dissatisfied with existing 
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institutions used to generate counternorms are existing institutions, the process is 
referred to as “regime shifting.”180 When the institutions are newly created, the term 
used is “competitive regime creation.”181 Coalitions pursue the contested 
multilateralism strategy when they are dissatisfied with existing institutions; they 
then threaten to either exit or create alternative institutions to pursue different 
policies.182 Three criteria define a situation involving contested multilateralism: 
(1) A multilateral institution exists within a defined issue area and with a 
mission and a set of established rules and institutionalized practices. 
(2) Dissatisfied with the status quo institution, a coalition of actors—
whether members of the existing institution or not—shifts the focus 
of its activity to a challenging institution with different rules and 
practices. This challenging institution can be either pre-existing or 
new. 
(3) The rules and institutionalized practices of the challenging institution 
conflict with or significantly modify the rules and institutionalized 
practices of the status quo institution.183 
Examples abound of both regime shifting and competitive regime creation in the 
international lawmaking system. 
a. Regime Shifting 
As described above, regime shifting involves state and nonstate actors 
relocating rulemaking processes to international venues that favor their concerns 
and interests.184 Laurence Helfer argues that countries “regime-shift” to use norms 
developed in other regimes to help define or inform norms created in the WTO.185 
In other words, countries, NGOs, consumer advocate groups, etc., seek to generate 
counter-WTO norms in other fora (perhaps to fill gaps, for example), and then 
seek to have WTO panels rely on these norms.186 Rather than seeking a single 
favorable decision, the goal of regime shifting “is an iterative, longer-term strategy 
that seeks to create outcomes that have feedback effects in other venues.”187 
Moving intellectual property from WIPO to the WTO in the early 1990s 
constituted a regime shift. This shift ended the relative isolation of intellectual 
 
institutions combine threats of exit, voice, and the creation of alternative institutions to pursue policies 
and practices different from those of existing institutions.”). 
180. Id. at 392. 
181. Id. at 398. 
182. Id. at 390. 
183. Id. at 388. 
184. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System, 7(1) 
PERSP. ON POL. 39 (2009) (“Regime shifting works by broadening the policy spaces within which 
relevant decisions are made and rules are adopted, thereby expanding the constellation of interests and 
issues that actors must consider when defining rules, norms, and decision-making procedures.”). 
185. Id. at 41. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 39. 
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property, which had previously occupied a specialized part of international law, 
unconnected or very loosely connected to other issue areas in international law.188 
Unlike the inclusion of services in international trade law, intellectual property did 
not involve a newly created issue area, as it existed long before the adoption of 
TRIPS. In fact, of all the subjects included in the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
intellectual property was the longest established internationally, having been the 
subject of treaty obligations under the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (1886) and the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (1883).189 
Originally under the aegis of WIPO, which administered both the Berne and 
Paris Conventions, intellectual property issues shifted to the WTO because 
developed countries became increasingly frustrated with WIPO’s failure to protect 
their IP-related interests.190 This led to faltering negotiations and eventually to these 
countries seeking a more favorable forum in the WTO, where their trading power 
gave them a competitive advantage and leverage.191 
The difficulty of changing TRIPS and its adverse effects, which only 
materialized following the adoption of TRIPS, contributed to another regime 
shift.192 Before the ink was dry on the TRIPS Agreement, efforts were underway to 
negotiate IP issues in WIPO rather than the WTO.193 As TRIPS was adopted in 
1994, deficiencies in its scope immediately surfaced: TRIPS did not address issues 
raised by the digital environment. Rather than return to the negotiating table after 
the tumultuous eight-year ordeal, developed states moved negotiations to WIPO, 
which drafted and now administers the WIPO Internet Treaties.194 
 
188. Id. 
189. See Berne Convention (governing copyrights); Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 
[hereinafter Paris Convention] (protecting patents and trademarks). WIPO administered both the Paris 
and Berne Conventions. 
190. See Helfer, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
191. See id. Prior to TRIPS, developing states attempted to weaken intellectual property rights 
within WIPO, while developed states sought to further protection, particularly as to pharmaceutical 
products. (“The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was the demand of developing countries 
that compulsory licenses be exclusive, meaning thereby that the patent owner be excluded from 
exploiting the invention in markets where a compulsory license has been issued. (footnote omitted) As 
is well known, this was one of the factors that led to the shifting of forum from WIPO to GATT and 
to the now-famous prefix ‘trade-related aspects of’ before ‘intellectual property rights.’”). Patents: An 
Indian Perspective, supra note 84, at 297–98 (footnote omitted). 
192. Cf. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies 
in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking 19  
(N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-53, 2009), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442785 [https://perma.cc/3LN4-LH4A] (“Because 
there are both formal and informal ties between WIPO and the WTO, developments in WIPO can 
create both freestanding intellectual property norms and also exert considerable influence on the 
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.”). 
193. Id. at 4. 
194. See Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet Treaties, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2379, 2379 (2009). The WIPO Internet Treaties consist of the WIPO Copyright 
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Developing countries also regime shift. Recent events in WIPO demonstrate 
that organizations devote increasing attention to issues peculiar to developing 
countries and to identifying policy space in which developing countries can 
operate.195 As such, developing countries in the last decade have sought to develop 
comprehensive protection for, among other things, genetic resources, folklore, and 
traditional knowledge; but they have done so in WIPO, rather than the WTO.196 
The shift back to WIPO has enabled developing countries to make significant 
progress on these contentious issues.197 
In both of these cases, either because of an impasse in one organization, or 
the perception that issues are weighted too heavily toward one side or the other, 
actors have relocated IIP issues to fora in which their interests are better served. 
They have used regime shifting either as an intermediate strategy to later have rules 
created and incorporated in TRIPS, or to have rules created in WIPO that would 
have the effect of constraining or broadening states’ discretion elsewhere.198 As 
 
Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Id. These treaties were 
meant to update and supplement existing IP treaties, such as TRIPS, by responding to developments 
in technology, hence the moniker “Internet Treaties.” Id. at 2379–80. The WCT, for example, addresses 
issues such as the treatment of temporary copies in computers’ random access memories, liability for 
Internet Service Providers for the infringing conduct of their subscribers, and the prohibition against 
the circumvention of technological protection measures used by copyright holders to prevent access 
and copying of their works. 
195. See Helfer, supra note 1, at 26, 27. 
196. See id. at 70, 71. 
197. Catherine Saez & William New, WIPO Assembly Extends Talks on Traditional Knowledge, 
Design; Sets Policy for New Offices, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2015/10/15/wipo-assembly-extends-talks-on-traditional-knowledge-design-sets-policy-
for-new-offices/ [https://perma.cc/AXT3-PN99].  
198. Of course, the efforts to secure greater protection of intellectual property need not occur 
within an organization at all. The United States and the European Union have concluded bilateral  
and plurilateral treaties to obtain protections greater than those obtained in TRIPS or elsewhere. The 
United States has negotiated bilateral agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Central 
America—Dominican Republic, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, and the Southern Africa Customs Union, among others. See U.S. TRADE REP., 
Free Trade Agreements, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements [https://
perma.cc/B7JR-6ZP4] (last visited Sept. 10, 2016); U.S. TRADE REP., Trade & Investment Framework 
Agreements, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements [https://
perma.cc/4ADH-UHCT] (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). These so-called TRIPS-plus treaties have been 
the subject of increasing criticism. “From the United States’ and European Union’s perspectives, 
bilateral agreements containing TRIPS-plus provisions remedy the perceived deficiencies in TRIPS, 
resolve TRIPS’ ambiguities in their favor, and limit TRIPS’ built-in flexibilities.” Harris, Adhesion Part 
II, supra note 3, at 207. Frederick Abbott refers to this as the “TRIPS II Agenda.” Frederick M. Abbott, 
TRIPS II, Asia and the Mercantile Pharmaceutical War: Implications for Innovation and Access 1 (Stanford 
Ctr. for Int’l Dev., Working Paper No. 308), http://scid.stanford.edu/publications/trips-ii-asia-and-
mercantile-pharmaceutical-war-implications-innovation-and-access    [https://perma.cc/859H-
XPJH]. The TRIPS I agenda was characterized by industries in developed countries wanting to prevent 
industries in developing countries from substituting counterfeit goods in local markets, while the TRIPS 
II Agenda has been concerned with competition from generic producers and “emerging originator 
enterprises.” Id. at 2 (footnote omitted); see also Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: 
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 80 (2004) (describing 
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should be evident, and as further explained below, the particular forum chosen 
strongly influences the negotiating strategy adopted by the various actors. 
b. Competitive Regime Creation 
Another form of contested multilateralism is competitive regime creation. 
Similar to regime shifting, competitive regime creation explains how and why actors 
pursue policies and practices different from those of existing institutions, this time 
by creating alternative institutions.199 
Clearly, competitive regime creation exacerbates the fragmentation of the 
international intellectual property regime. And as with regime shifting, it is 
contingent upon credible threats of outside options, whether such options include 
existing institutions or the ability to create a competing institution.200 Power 
imbalances influence state options under this approach.201 While powerful states 
have formal and informal means to create alternative mechanisms, weaker states 
have fewer options, and may only be able to mount “symbolic challenge[s].”202 
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) is an example of 
competitive regime creation. In the early 1980s, public health officials concerned 
 
the European Union efforts to secure TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements); Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual 
Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 509 (2005) (describing 
how developed countries reneged on their obligations to transfer technology while demanding that 
developing countries comply with their TRIPS obligations); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? 
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 128–
29 (2004) (describing how U.S. bilateralism is the dominant policy of the United States post-TRIPS and 
is designed to roll back both substantive and strategic gains of the TRIPS Agreement for developing 
countries). See generally Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 109 (2012) (“[T]he offer of increased 
market access by the United States in exchange for the other country accepting ‘TRIPS-plus’ 
commitments on domestic intellectual property regulation (i.e., minimum standards in excess of those 
required by the TRIPS Agreement).”); Pedro Roffe et al., Intellectual Property Rights in Free Trade 
Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum Standards, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 266, 273 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 
2010) (discussing the proliferation of “TRIPS-plus” intellectual property standards in free trade 
agreements, particularly between developing countries and the United States); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS 
Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 
(2011). 
199. See Contested Multilateralism, supra note 4, at 392. 
200. See id. at 390 (“The key is that the challenging coalition must have an alternative to the 
existing institution that would serve its interests, and the coalition must be able to credibly threaten to 
use this alternative organization or practice. State power is a major determinant of whether coalitions 
have outside options.”). 
201. See id. (“A group of dissatisfied actors that includes states with significant resources and 
institutional leverage will have an easier time identifying credible outside options than a coalition of 
weaker actors.”). 
202. See id. at 389 (“A dissatisfied coalition composed of primarily weak states, for example, 
may only be able to mount a symbolic challenge, critiquing an existing institutional practice but being 
unable to force immediate change. Over time, however, such a challenge may change actor preferences, 
ideas, and values in a way that delegitimizes an institution, forcing concomitant changes or institutional 
exit.”). Recent developments may challenge this conclusion. 
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with producing vaccines for developing world diseases harnessed advances in 
biotechnology.203 The World Health Organization (WHO) was the natural choice 
to coordinate efforts, as it was the central multilateral institution for global health 
issues. However, health advocates soon became dissatisfied with WHO’s efforts, 
and so a coalition of nonstate actors, including civil society organizations, public 
health advocates, and the vaccine industry, created GAVI outside the structure of 
the WHO;204 they accomplished this despite WHO resistance.205 GAVI successfully 
worked with outside support, including the Gates Foundation and the World 
Bank.206 WHO’s resistance helped generate this competitive regime creation and 
through contested multilateralism, GAVI “challenged WHO’s dominance of 
vaccine development and delivery.”207 
Morse and Keohane note that attempts at contested multilateralism are 
“remarkably common” and occur across issue areas, including intellectual property, 
renewable energy, health, and security.208 Moreover, contested multilateralism 
targets not only the institutional rules but also the missions or practices of 
established organizations.209 In sum, contested multilateralism has been used to 
create, reinforce, or expand regime complexes and, in the context of patent 
exemptions, it can be used to help analyze how such moves affect the international 
system.210 
c. Grassroots Movements 
Traditional grassroots and social movements also have much to teach us about 
effectuating change in institutions, practices, and rules. Not surprisingly, many 
similarities exist between these efforts and the efforts described above. One area 
where grassroots movements have enjoyed considerable success is in the human 
rights arena. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations 
(IOs) continually find obstacles in the international community. Particularly with 
regard to the human rights and labor movement, the NGOS and IOs must advocate 
policy changes that affect the “big players” in the international community, such as 
transnational corporations and powerful developed states. For this reason, 
grassroots movements seek out powerful enforcement mechanisms within 
 
203. See id. at 403. 
204. See id. at 404. 
205. See id. 
206. See id. 
207. Id. at 404 (“GAVI emerged . . . because of organization resistance by the WHP and 
incomplete information that prevented the WHO from accurately gauging the seriousness of the 
challenge.”). 
208. Id. at 407. 
209. Id. 
210. See id. 
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organizations such as the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO).211 
Dean Hubbard illustrates how grassroots efforts in the workers’ rights 
movement successfully moved the needle on international protection for laborers’ 
rights, while also detailing the particular obstacles for the movement.212 NGOs and 
IOs encountered considerable resistance in traditional enforcement mechanisms 
such as the UN, the ICJ, and ILO.213 The structure of the UN reinforces the status 
quo between developing and developed states because the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council and its ten rotating members effectively control the 
decision-making process.214 In theory, the ICJ could serve as a forum, but its 
judgments are only enforceable by the UN Security Council, which presents the 
same obstacles.215 The ILO is ostensibly the natural forum to pursue changes for 
workers’ rights; however, the tripartite structure of this organization requires an 
unlikely consensus among government representatives, employers, and workers 
before it can act.216 Thus, the power structures within these international bodies 
only reinforce the status quo. 
The seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the international arena led 
workers’ rights advocates to turn to regional forums.217 But as Hubbard explains, 
these regional efforts must be linked to transnational networks in order to build the 
power structure necessary for transforming the systemic political and economic 
environment.218 Hubbard advocates diverse, decentralized movements as the means 
by which the status quo in the international order can be overcome. 
Hubbard identifies four steps in the process that can lead to successful 
grassroots movements.219 First, the domestic government blocks action and thus 
creates social pressure for change.220 Second, grassroots efforts in the form of active 
leadership and coordinated collective action foster community.221 Third, the local 
activists seek out international allies.222 Lastly, Transnational Action Networks 
 
211. See Dean Hubbard, Reimagining Workers’ Human Rights: Transformative Organizing for a 
Socially Aware Global Economy, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 8–15 (2008) [hereinafter 
Hubbard, Reimagining Workers’ Human Rights]. 
212. The workers’ rights movement advocated change within the human rights regime. See 
id. at 3 (describing the changes in workers’ rights as economic human rights law). 
213. Id. at 8–10. 
214. Id. at 12 (“The U.N.’s espousal of the ideals of economic human rights generates an 
appearance of legitimacy, but when it comes down to the reality of power, the world’s economic 
powerhouses arguably use the U.N. and its agencies in a stark exercise of authority over the world’s 
developing nations.”). 
215. Id. at 9. 
216. Id. at 9–10. 
217. See id. at 13. 
218. Id. at 25. 
219. See id. at 25–26. 
220. See id. at 25. 
221. See id. at 26. 
222. See id. at 25. 
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(TANs) bring pressure to bear on states or corporations from angles other than 
those traditionally pursued, such as the UN, ICJ, and ILO.223 
However, grassroots movements need active leadership of workers at 
grassroots levels.224 This entails coordinated collective action among the heads of 
social movements and subsidiary local groups.225 Central to this approach, the 
leaders of the grassroots movement need to teach “ordinary people” at the local 
level or “bottom” of the movement to make their own demands, rather than relying 
on someone to speak for them.226 
Once the “bottom” of the grassroots movement at the local level has 
solidified, Hubbard suggests that the movement create a network to establish a 
climate and culture where the action or movement can thrive.227 This can be in the 
form of small local groups such as workplaces, schools, and communities that are 
linked to other similar groups in different locations.228 Here, NGOs and IOs 
participating in the grassroots movement collaborate with groups outside the NGO 
sphere, including the academic community, the media, and social networking 
groups.229 Through these communities, and particularly through TANs, changes to 
status quo emerge. 
d. The Marrakesh Treaty for the Blind 
Two other events in the IIP system merit discussion. What these events reveal 
is that change to the international intellectual property landscape can occur in 
traditional IP settings, for example within the WTO and WIPO. Two key 
developments in international intellectual property law provide examples of this 
phenomenon, and might provide additional insights on how to change the policy 
and normative landscape of the IIL system. These developments include the 2001 
Doha Declaration and the 2013 Marrakesh Treaty for the Blind.230 Both are 
revolutionary in different ways. Both were accomplished in different venues. Both 
are noteworthy not only because of the process by which each was achieved, but 
also because of the result that each obtained. 
 
223. See id. at 25–26. 
224. Id. at 24. 
225. See id. (“Experience has repeatedly proven that grass roots community and workplace 
organizations that facilitate ordinary people’s coordinated struggles to gain control over their political, 
economic, and cultural lives are the most effective vehicles for systemic change.”). 
226. Id. at 24–25. 
227. Id. at 25. 
228. Id. 
229. George E. Edwards, Assessing the Effectiveness of Human Rights Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) from the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st Century: Ten Attributes of Highly 
Successful Human Rights NGOs, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 207 (2010). 
230. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002); Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Public Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities, 
June 27, 2013, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/diplconf/en/vip_dc/vip_dc_8.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DUG4-DCPQ] [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty]. 
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Ninety percent of the over 314 million visually impaired persons in the world 
live in developing states.231 Moreover, of the over two million books published per 
year per country, less than 7 percent are published in formats accessible to the 
visually impaired.232 Copyright law, particularly its reach into digital and electronic 
media, is blamed for this “book famine.”233 Although a number of countries’ 
copyright laws have specific provisions allowing for exceptions for visually impaired 
persons (usually Braille or large print), the vast majority does not.234 
The 2013 Marrakesh Treaty for the Blind (Marrakesh Treaty) goes a long way 
towards remedying this. The Marrakesh Treaty was accomplished through a 
coordinated effort of NGOs and developing countries. Though efforts to create 
copyright exceptions for the blind began as early as the 1980s, the movement gained 
traction in international conversations when, in 2003, Professor Sam Ricketson 
prepared for WIPO an examination of copyrights exceptions for the visually 
impaired.235 
The movement took off in 2008 when The World Blind Union and 
Knowledge Ecology International convened an expert group to consider a possible 
treaty for blind, visually impaired, and other reading disabled persons. The World 
Blind Union, in particular, spearheaded efforts to raise public consciousness about 
the international human rights aspect of access to information and the book famine. 
The following year, developing countries presented to WIPO the World Blind 
Union’s proposed Treaty for the Blind, which after much negotiation and 
modification ultimately formed the basis for the Marrakesh Treaty.236 
The Marrakesh Treaty is unique in many ways.237 Most importantly, the 
Marrakesh Treaty is the first in IIP that expressly recognizes minimum standards 
for limitations and exceptions to copyright.238 Prior to the Marrakesh Treaty, all other 
 
231. Action Plan, World Health Org., Vision 2020 Global Initiative for the Elimination of 
Avoidable Blindness: Action Plan 2006-20011, 1, 3 (2007). 




234. World Intell. Prop. Org., Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually 
Impaired, 1, 70 (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_15/
sccr_15_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/H87G-HSD2]. 
235.  Danielle Conway, The Miracle at Marrakesh: Doing Justice for the Blind and Visually Impaired 
While Changing the Culture of Norm Setting at WIPO, in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS (Irene Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015). 
236. Proposals were submitted by Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay, and the African Group. Later, 
the United States and European Union also submitted proposals. 
237. Unlike previous international standards, the four substantive obligations imposed by the 
treaty are unique in that they expressly recognize international minimum standards for limitations and 
exceptions. 
238. Lesley Ellen Harris, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons 
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, COPYRIGHTLAWS.COM (Aug. 1, 2015), 
http://www.copyrightlaws.com/international/marrakesh-treaty-to-facilitate-access-to-published-
Harris_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:36 AM 
2016] THE POWER OF IDEAS 385 
WIPO initiatives sought to protect, promote, or enforce IP rights. The Marrakesh 
Treaty did the opposite: “[I]t aims to formalise a global normative framework that 
scales back IP rights by introducing exceptions and limitations to copyrights in 
order to make copyrighted works accessible to visually impaired persons, persons 
with other disabilities, libraries, archives, research and education.”239 
The Marrakesh Treaty has four substantive requirements. Countries must (1) 
adopt limitations and exceptions in their national copyright laws that provide the 
right to reproduce, distribute, and make available works in accessible formats for 
beneficiary persons; (2) provide for export of an accessible format copy; (3) permit 
import of an accessible format copy; and (4) ensure that legal remedies against 
circumvention of effective technological protection measures (TPMs) do not 
prevent beneficiary persons from enjoying the limitations and exceptions provided 
for in the Marrakesh Treaty.240 The Marrakesh Treaty provides a striking example 
of the shift in international attitudes toward intellectual property, viewing enhanced 
protection with skepticism and challenging the dominant IP rationale.241 
e. The Doha Declaration 
The Doha Declaration provides another striking example of shifting IIP 
attitudes. It was widely believed that because of the stalemate between developed 
countries that wanted to further strengthen TRIPS protections and developing 
countries that sought to limit TRIPS, TRIPS was ultimately impervious to change. 
The Doha Declaration is perhaps the most well-known post-TRIPS event that cast 




239. Nandini Kotthapally, From World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to World 
Innovation Promotion Organization (WIPO)? Whither WIPO?, 3 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., no. 1, 
2011, at 59. 
240. Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 230, art. 4(1), 6, 7. 
241.   Although some wanted the treaty to cover audiovisual works, the treaty as concluded covers 
only works consisting of “text, notation and/or related illustrations”—essentially, print works—that 
are published or otherwise made publicly available in any media. Id. at art. 2(a). The treaty defines its 
beneficiaries as persons who are blind; who have visual impairments or perceptual or reading disabilities 
that render them unable to read printed works to the same degree as those who do not have such 
impairments or disabilities; or who are otherwise unable, due to physical disabilities, to hold or 
manipulate books or focus or move their eyes to the extent that would be normally acceptable for 
reading. Id. at art. 3. 
 The treaty has two main operative provisions: The first requires parties to adopt limitations and 
exceptions to copyright, as further defined in the treaty, to facilitate access by treaty beneficiaries to 
formats of works that are accessible to them. Id. at art. 4. The second requires parties to allow cross-
border exchange of accessible-format copies, so that an accessible-format copy made in one state could 
be sent to and used in another state. Id. at art. 5. Importantly, “accessible format” is understood to 
include, not only formats that are specialized for visually impaired use, such as Braille, and audio 
generated by synthetic voice technology, but also commercially available audiobooks. The treaty has 
not yet entered into force; it will enter into force three months after twenty eligible parties have 
deposited their instruments of ratification or accession. Id. at art. 18. 
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The TRIPS Council is the body responsible for administering TRIPS and for 
clarifying and interpreting TRIPS provisions.242 The Council passed the lone 
amendment to TRIPS, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (2001),243 the accompanying Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration (2003),244 and the Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement (2005), all of which concerned the permissibility of and conditions under 
which countries could issue compulsory licenses.245 
As it relates to pharmaceutical products, compulsory licensing was also an area 
of intense negotiations leading up to TRIPS. Developed countries generally sought 
stronger protection of patented technologies, including pharmaceuticals.246 
Developing countries coveted easier access to patented technology, primarily 
through compulsory licenses. 
The compromise resulting from the negotiations was TRIPS Article 31.247 
That section, titled “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder,” gives 
countries broad discretion on, inter alia, government use of compulsory licensing.248 
However, the grounds are not unlimited; TRIPS contains numerous conditions that 
must be met before a government can authorize licenses. Three of the main 
conditions are that, as a general rule, (1) an effort should be made to negotiate a 
voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms, (2) the government must provide 
for “adequate remuneration” to the right holder, and (3) the licensed use must be 
“predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.”249 
While negotiations surrounding the TRIPS compulsory licensing provision 
were contentious, compulsory licensing in action took center stage in 2001, when 
South Africa attempted to reduce drug costs and address its AIDS pandemic by 
enacting the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment 
Act of 1997 (the Act).250 The Act allowed local manufacturers to make AIDS drugs 
(compulsory licensing) or import them from neighboring countries that produced 
them less expensively than the patent owners (parallel importation).251 The Act 
 
242. The Council is also responsible for monitoring compliance with states’ TRIPS obligations 
by reviewing states’ national implementation legislation. 
243. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 746 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
244. Id. 
245. Jayashree Watal, From Punta Del Este to Doha and Beyond: Lessons from the TRIPs 
Negotiating Processes, 3 WIPO J. 24, 26 (2011) [hereinafter WIPO JOURNAL]. To read which NGOs 
were helpful to the amendment process, see James Love, What the 2001 Doha Declaration Changed, 
KNOWLEDGE ECON. INT’L (Sept. 16, 2011), http://keionline.org/node/1267 [https://perma.cc/
2XJX-5BFQ]. 
246. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound , supra note 29.  
247. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 31. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 (S. Afr.). 
251. Id. at §§ 15C(b), 22A(11)(a). 
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sought to ensure the supply of drugs at affordable prices, thus allowing those in 
need to obtain the drugs much less expensively than they would be able to 
otherwise.252 
In response to the Act, the patent owners of the HIV/AIDS drugs—primarily 
European and U.S. pharmaceutical companies—objected, arguing that the Act 
violated international patent laws, including TRIPS.253 According to these parties, 
the Act violated TRIPS because it allowed the South African Minister of Health to 
act unilaterally without first proving that a drug manufacturer abused its patent, and 
it allowed local manufacturers to make the drugs without first seeking the patent 
owner’s permission—both of which are required under TRIPS.254 
Although the pharmaceutical companies eventually dismissed the suit, the suit 
highlighted the likelihood that patents and monopoly pricing would keep essential 
medicines out of the reach of millions of HIV/AIDS patients. This “growing crisis” 
led WTO Members to meet in Doha, Qatar, to engage in extensive negotiations to 
address the issue. 
In April 2001, in Norway, the WTO Secretariat coordinated with the WHO 
Secretariat and developed a Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of 
Essential Medicines.255 At about the same time, in a TRIPS Council meeting, the 
African Group requested a special discussion on IP and access to medicines.256 This 
took place in June 2001. Developing country demands and pressure from civil 
society groups that were insistent on improved access to essential medicines caused 
the WTO Ministerial Conference to adopt the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health in November 2001.257 
The Doha Declaration confirmed that patents would not prohibit countries 
from using compulsory licenses to address public health needs.258 It also granted 
countries wide discretion and great flexibility in issuing compulsory licenses, 
including the grounds upon which such licenses could be issued and the amount of 
remuneration given to the patentee.259 The Doha Declaration also identified a 
glaring weakness of TRIPS’ compulsory licensing provision: the inability of 
countries lacking sufficient manufacturing capacity to take advantage of compulsory 
 
252. Id. 
253. Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory 
Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 384 (2011). 
254. Id. at 384–85. 
255. See WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Special 
Discussion on Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines, WTO Doc No IP/C/M/31 (Restricted) ( July 
10, 2001), http://www.iatp.org/files/Special_Discussion_on_Intellectual_Property_an.htm [https://
perma.cc/C2WE-NKD9]. 
256. See id. 
257. Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision On Implementation Of Paragraph 6 Of The Doha 
Declaration On The Trips Agreement And Public Health: A Solution To The Access To Essential Medicines 
Problem?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73, 81–82 (2004). 
258. Harris, supra note 253, at 386. 
259. Id. 
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licenses to locally manufacture generic medicines. This was remedied a few years 
later with the August 30, 2003 Decision, which led to an Amendment of Article 31: 
Article 31bis.260 
On December 6, 2005, the WTO Members adopted the Amendment to 
Article 31.261 The Amendment enabled countries without the capacity to 
manufacture generic substitutes for patented pharmaceuticals under domestic 
compulsory licenses to import those substitutes from countries that had the 
manufacturing capability, without risk of interference from patent holders.262 Article 
31bis was intended to address the “public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics.”263 
The Doha process achieved what many before then had thought impossible: 
amending the TRIPS Agreement. As I have stated elsewhere, both the process and 
the result were significant: 
As to the process, the WTO members reached a consensus; it was only 
through their coordinated efforts that they were able eventually to produce 
the Declaration and then the Amendment. This is nothing short of a 
miracle, given the challenges involved in getting the WTO Members to 
agree to what that amendment would entail. Compulsory licensing became 
politically salient only shortly after TRIPS took effect and at a time when 
it seemed unlikely that the parties would consider renegotiating an 
agreement that took over eight years to conclude (the Uruguay Round 
lasted from 1986-1994). Yet, the WTO members responded and reached a 
consensus on a contentious issue. 
Moreover, the fact that they were able to use the system in the manner they 
did demonstrates that the system is flexible enough to permit a political 
process to generate a result that was better than the status quo. The 
significance of amending a WTO Agreement cannot be overstated. To 
date, only one WTO Agreement has ever been amended—TRIPS Article 
31. In view of the hard fought gains made during the Uruguay Round, and 
the contentious nature of much of the negotiations, such an achievement 
demonstrates that TRIPS is responsive to change and that WTO members 





263. Id. (quoting World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 ¶ 1 (2002)). 
264. Id. at 396–97. Unfortunately, amending TRIPS again is improbable. For almost fifteen 
years, developing countries have attempted to amend TRIPS to clarify the relationship between TRIPS 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), hoping to incorporate a patent disclosure 
requirement, which would substantiate prior informed consent and benefit-sharing with the country of 
origin of any biological material and associated traditional knowledge. See Ahmed Abdel Latif, Change 
and Continuity in the International Intellectual Property System: A Turbulent Decade in Perspective, 3 WIPO 
J., 36, 42 (2011) (“Their latest proposal, in this regard, was submitted to the TRIPs Council in April 
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In short, the Doha Declaration was revolutionary, as it led to the only 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. The Amendment was the result of 
widespread participation by NGOs and their coordinated efforts with developing 
countries. Unlike the examples above, the Doha Declaration was realized within the 
existing structure of the WTO. As with the Marrakesh Treaty, the Doha Declaration 
is part of the latest shift in IP thinking, challenging the IP maximalist dogma and 
reinterpreting TRIPS as more flexible and reflective of the appropriate balance 
between right holders’ interests and the public interest. 
Against this background, a number of lessons might be learned. First, there is 
a change in tide. Developing countries have mobilized and put a halt, if only 
temporarily, to the ever-increasing rights granted to intellectual property holders. 
This illustrates Kapczynski’s framing theory in action.265 In stark contrast to the 
conventional IP maximalist philosophy underpinning TRIPS’s initial movement, a 
new notion has arisen that frames intellectual property not as a right, but as a means 
for improving social and economic development for all countries, particularly 
developing countries. 
Second, there are two important consequences that flow from this shift. It is 
unlikely that new norms enhancing IP protection will arise outside the current 
efforts by the United States/EU in bilateral and plurilateral treaties—and even these 
have come under increasing attacks. Furthermore, as clearly established by the Doha 
Declaration, the Marrakesh Treaty for the Blind, and other recent developments, 
developing countries’ interests can sometimes take precedence over the interests of 
individual right holders. While tension between these interests remains and will 
continue, the global outcry against intellectual property rights that limit countries’ 
discretion in vital areas of public interest has given civil rights organizations, NGOs, 
developing countries, etc. a platform for change in the IIP system. However, if 
history is any guide, this opportunity may not last. The cyclical nature of the IIP 
system and, particularly, the battle between stronger protection for intellectual 
property rights and the public interest in benefiting from the use of intellectual 
property suggests that now is the time to press forward. The examples of lawmaking 
above can provide guidance on how to do so. 
VI. THE DECLARATION: A NEW MODE OF IIP LAWMAKING? 
The Declaration does not fit neatly within any of the above modes of 
lawmaking. It is outside the dominant state-centric institutions, and involves an 
issue that is already part of the international discourse, unlike the services narrative. 
But this is of no consequence. The previous section was intended to highlight two 
points. The first is the changing nature of IIP lawmaking. The point here was 
neither to suggest that these are exhaustive modes of lawmaking, nor to highlight 
 
2011. However, that proposal continues to face strong opposition and has little chance of being 
concretized in any near future, more so in the context of the current stalemate in the Doha Round of 
Trade Negotiations.”). 
265. Kapczynski, supra note 152, at 884–85. 
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any particular mode of lawmaking. Rather, it was meant to capture the changing 
nature of lawmaking and to point out that international actors have these paths 
available to them. In that sense, the preceding section breaks no new ground, but it 
is a reminder not to focus myopically on one mode when others are available. 
The second point is that despite seemingly overwhelming odds, change can 
indeed happen, and it can happen with regard to controversial and contentious 
issues. The Doha Declaration and accompanying Protocol significantly changed the 
rules regarding states’ ability to manufacture and export pharmaceutical drugs—an 
extremely contentious issue. The Amendment changed existing rules, which is no 
easy task. The Marrakesh Treaty did not change existing law, but just as importantly, 
it created new mandates for countries to expand—as a right—their copyright 
limitations and exceptions, again providing countries greater discretion in 
implementing intellectual property laws by expressly taking into account other 
interests. States’ discretion in general, and specifically with regard to pharmaceutical 
products, as well as the ability to expand limitations and exceptions to intellectual 
property rights, are relevant with regard to the Max Planck Institute Declaration on 
Patent Protection. 
How, then, might we use the Declaration? I do not pretend here that there is 
a silver bullet, nor do I advocate for a particular approach in order to achieve the 
desired ends. What I do share is the ultimate goal of the Declaration. I do not, 
however, believe the solution lies with the unorthodox interpretation advanced in 
the Declaration. Renouncing the negotiating history and overcoming de facto stare 
decisis are obstacles not easily overcome. 
The Declaration presents an opportunity. The Declaration can leverage the 
lessons of these various modes of lawmaking to realize its desired objective. 
Moreover, doing so by these alternative modes allows the Declaration to purchase 
legitimacy and certainty. 
While there is no silver bullet, the prior successful models provide some ideas. 
First, the forum matters. While this is undoubtedly true in most global governance, 
in intellectual property, the decision-making forum impact is more pronounced.266 
Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea observe that for states wishing to better balance 
owners’ interests and public interests, multilateral institutions fare better than other 
institutions (e.g., bilateral and plurilateral arrangements).267 Multilateral regimes are 
superior because of “their ability to reflect and achieve a finer balance among the 
interests at stake.”268 If this is true, WIPO seems to be the forum with the greatest 
promise. 
 
266. Thomas Cottier & Marina Foltea, Global Governance in Intellectual Property Protection: Does 
the Decision-making Forum Matter?, 3 WIPO J. 139, 143 (2012). 
267. Id. (“[M]ultilateral institutions offer a more appropriate balance of rights and obligations 
than bilateral and plurilateral instruments.”). The authors note that “the interests to be weighed depend 
on the issues and the forms of IP concerned in a specific case and may appear in diverse forms.” Id. 
268. Id. 
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Immediately after the WTO was created, WIPO lost relevance. Since then, 
however, WIPO has been successful at reestablishing itself as a major venue for 
negotiating intellectual property issues. This is important because the WTO has 
become a more difficult forum in which to negotiate, as evidenced by the stalled 
Development Round.269 Moreover, the WIPO process is markedly different and 
more favorable than the WTO. In particular, WIPO, unlike the WTO, permits 
private parties to participate.270 These private parties play a significant role at WIPO 
negotiations.271 The Secretariat has accredited various NGOs, which are now 
permitted to attend most preparatory meetings as well as the formal negotiating 
sessions.272 They observe and participate, “making ‘interventions’ to explain to 
governments their perspectives on the issues.”273 In contrast, the WTO is decidedly 
less open, not only excluding private parties but also limiting the distribution of 
WTO documents that are submitted or drafted by governments.274 The WIPO level 
of transparency and openness provides greater room for parties to balance interests 
to the mutual advantage of different interest groups.275 As Cottier and Foltea state: 
“This type of decision-making is more likely to garner the support of national 
lawmakers on the merits of the negotiated proposal and undoubtedly enhances the 
legitimacy of the multilateral norm-setting process.”276 
A number of other factors also favor WIPO. It is the venue of the most recent 
success story, the Marrakesh Treaty, which also involved limitations and exceptions 
to intellectual property rights. Further, it is also the forum that administers the treaty 
to which TRIPS’s limitation and exceptions provisions and the three-step test owe 
their origin: the Berne Convention. TRIPS’s limitations and exceptions provisions 
were all modeled on Berne Article 9.2, which provides: “It shall be a matter for 
legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works 
in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author.”277 While there are some differences, it would not seem 
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inappropriate for WIPO to issue an authoritative interpretation of corresponding 
TRIPS provisions, particularly as WIPO and the WTO have engaged more recently 
in collaborative efforts. 
Second, beyond the forum, process matters. Jayashree Watal, the Indian 
negotiator during the TRIPS negotiations and a counselor at the WTO Intellectual 
Property Division, provides valuable insight regarding the different outcomes for 
developing countries in TRIPS as contrasted with Doha by contrasting the process 
involved in each.278 In particular, she identifies three main considerations that led 
to the successful Doha outcome, which were absent for developing countries in the 
decidedly less than successful TRIPS outcome.279 First, she states that a genuine 
coalition presenting a coherent, united front is more likely to succeed than not.280 
Second, she advises, “negotiating proposals need to be specific and credible.”281 
Finally, she notes that an important factor contributing to the credibility of 
negotiating positions is public support.282 
In greater detail, she explains how during TRIPS the developed countries had 
a coordinated plan, directed by the United States and European Communities, and 
came forward with a detailed draft for TRIPS negotiations.283 In contrast, 
developing countries did not prepare a counterdraft and instead relied on the GATT 
Secretariat to prepare one draft for all developing countries, but that draft contained 
vague and general language and did not fully or accurately represent the various 
differences among the developing countries.284 Further, “interested parties in 
developed countries spread the perception that developing countries were pirates 
and counterfeiters—and by and large, the moral high ground was held by the 
accusers.”285 This put developing countries on the defensive with regard to 
intellectual property, a position from which they did not recover. These, she claims, 
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were important factors outside the TRIPS negotiations that influenced the final 
outcome.286 
Doha was different. There, developing countries presented a unified front. 
Due to active campaigning by civil society groups with regard to access to essential 
medicines, the public took “keen interest” in this issue throughout the buildup to 
Doha.287 During negotiations, key delegations made statements to the press, who 
were waiting outside council meetings, “demonstrating how the statements were 
made as much for public consumption as for other Members.”288 Moreover, in 
addition to the African Group, which proposed to the WTO Council a meeting on 
the subject, a substantial group of developing states submitted a joint proposal at 
the Council meeting requesting a special declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
access to medicines.289 This joint proposal ultimately formed the basis of the Doha 
Declaration.290 “Thus,” as Watal exclaims, “developing countries spoke in one voice 
and set the agenda by focusing on clarification of TRIPs flexibilities.”291 She 
compares the response of the developed countries: “However, when it came to 
making a counter submission to the developing countries’ text or to the later more 
legalistic text to help negotiate a declaration, the United States, joined by Australia, 
Canada, Japan and Switzerland, only came up with general preambular language 
even as late as one month before the Doha ministerial meeting.”292 It is no surprise, 
then, that the outcomes of TRIPS and Doha differed significantly. 
Watal’s insight about public perception coincides with Kapczynski’s about 
framing. Kapczynski argues that “acts of interpretation” play a vital role in 
“instigating, promoting, and legitimating collective action.”293 She argues that 
“[t]hese acts of interpretation or framing are both socially mediated and 
contingent.”294 As she explains, “ideas can be a resource for those engaged in 
mobilization, but one that is not fully in their control. Frames thus can lay the 
scaffolding for a countermovement even as they pave the way for a movement’s 
success.”295 Like Watal, Kapczynski credits public support, garnered by effective 
framing, as being crucial to the success of the access to medicines campaign.296 
Building on these insights, the drafters can then lean on the teachings above 
regarding the new dynamics of intellectual property lawmaking and grassroots 
movements. The contribution of these efforts begins with the process of forming a 
community of experts, with the goal of presenting a unified position on TRIPS’s 
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flexibilities that reaches decision makers responsible for forming IP policy. The 
Declaration has an excellent start, having been drafted by experts from across the 
globe. The key here is not only to clarify positions, but also to raise public 
consciousness. Of course, access to top policymakers will be crucial. 
As should be obvious, these efforts need not be limited to intellectual property 
folks, as public interest often overlays with other regimes. This provides an 
opportunity to join with other groups, civil rights organizations, and those 
interested in the greater use of goods to increase social welfare. The reach of 
intellectual property into many other diverse areas should make joining with other 
groups a relatively easy task. Also, again, WIPO’s framework supports this. Here, 
too, reports, articles, and the Declaration can be widely disseminated, as was done 
in the labor movement’s successes. Moreover, as was done there, transnational 
action networks must be developed to provide alternative and additional channels 
for communication. In the realm of human rights, NGOs have enacted this step by 
playing major roles in conferences in areas other than human rights, such as 
nutrition, development, and peace.297 I submit that these steps might be a starting 
point. 
CONCLUSION 
Above I detailed efforts by nonstate actors, such as the Max Planck Institute 
and the drafters of the Declaration for Patent Protection, to agitate to generate 
pressure on existing doctrine, with an eye towards undermining that doctrine in the 
long term. Perhaps there is nothing extraordinary going on here and the ideas 
contained in the Declaration represent part of an ongoing give-and-take over trade 
rules that constitutes a healthy trade politics. But I am not optimistic about the 
content of the Declaration, even while sharing the Declaration’s ultimate goal. I 
believe the doctrine holding the Declaration together is not strong enough to 
renounce the TRIPS’s negotiating history or to ignore contrary WTO decisions. 
But my pessimism does not lead me to abandon the Declaration. Instead, it 
leads me to look for other ways to achieve the goal by examining other modes of 
lawmaking. In short, rather than looking to the unorthodox reading or 
interpretation of the Declaration, we should look at the Declaration not for what it 
says but as a rallying point or catalyst to utilize these other forms of lawmaking. We 
can lean on these to open the door for legal change. We can do so by looking for 
new connections (as was done with services) or new multinational agents (as was 
done with access to medicines), and by employing the fragmented IIP process (as 
was done with TRIPS). Ironically, and importantly, the Declaration can serve this 
purpose. 
In sum, the fight is not over. We can borrow from the rare and hard fought 
successes, such as Doha and Marrakesh, and translate these successes to the 
Declaration’s struggle. It is with renewed hope that I join this struggle. 
 
297. Hubbard, Reimagining Workers’ Human Rights, supra note 211, at 27–28, 42. 
